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Security APIs are designed to enable the storage and processing of confidential data
without that data becoming known to individuals who are not permitted to obtain it, and
are central to the operation of Automated Teller Machines (ATM) networks, Electronic
Point of Sale (EPOS) terminals, set-top boxes for subscription-based TV, pre-payment
utility meters, and electronic ticketing for an increasing number of public transport
systems (e.g., Oyster in London).
However, since the early 2000s, it has become clear that many of the security APIs
in widespread use contain subtle flaws which allow malicious individuals to subvert
the security restrictions and obtain confidential data that should be protected.
In this thesis, we attempt to address this problem by presenting a type system in
which specific security properties are guaranteed to be enforced by security APIs that
are well-typed. Since type-checking is a form of static analysis, it does not suffer from
the scalability issues associated with approaches that simulate interactions between a
security API and one or more malicious individuals.
We also show how our type system can be used to model an existing security API
and provide the same guarantees of security that the API authors proved it upholds.
This result follows directly from producing a well-typed implementation of the API,




Computers are used to protect an increasingly large amount of private information and
also to control access to services. Common examples include ensuring that only you
can withdraw money from your account at a cash machine, and that you can only watch
the TV channels that you have paid for.
To provide these protections and controls, the computer system typically contains a
physically secure component where sensitive ‘encryption keys’ and ‘decryption keys’
are stored. Encryption is a method which allows information to be made unreadable
unless the corresponding ’decryption key’ is known. The secure component provides
a series of actions which it can be asked to do by the computer. In the above cash
machine example, this secure component is responsible for saying whether or not the
PIN number entered is correct.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to guarantee that the set of actions provided by the
secure component cannot be used in an unintended way to bypass the protections that it
is designed to enforce. The research presented in this thesis allows us to provide such a
guarantee, for certain sets of actions. This result is achieved by providing rules which
govern how an action should work. We then show how these rules can be applied to a
set of actions which are known to be secure, and discuss how the restrictions enforced
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The transmission and processing of sensitive information forms a significant and ever-
growing part of the digital world in which we live. In the consumer space, pay-TV is
pervasive, online banking and shopping continue to go from strength to strength, while
financial institutions are teaming up with retailers and mobile device manufacturers
to try and convince us that we should use our mobile phones as electronic wallets.
However, electronic payment systems such as pre-pay tokens for gas and electricity
have been around since the 1970s, while many public transit systems around the world
allow people to use pre-payment cards (e.g., the Oyster card in London).
The secure transmission of data itself is a goal which people have been striving to
achieve for over 2,000 years. Developments in this area have generally been led by
governments and militaries, and the resulting arms race between cryptographers and
cryptanalysts is what has ultimately enabled so many of the services we use today.
Cryptography is the foundation of information hiding, and modern ciphers such as
Triple-DES and AES are considered unbreakable given current computing hardware.
This is because the strength of such ciphers is related to the size of the encryption key
and, unless some flaw is discovered that sufficiently weakens the cipher, it is enough
to simply increase the key length in line with any increase in computing power.
Consequently, attempts to break secure systems typically focus on areas other than
the cipher itself, with the aim of recovering the necessary encryption and/or decryption
keys. These other areas include the security protocol which defines the sequence of
messages that communicating parties exchange, and the security API which defines
the functions that a security component provides. It is the latter of these two areas
which we consider in this thesis.
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1.1 Security APIs
A security API is a collection of operations which together implement an Application
Programming Interface designed to enforce a given security policy through careful use
of cryptographic operations. In general, the security policy will specify that certain
data items cannot appear in the clear outside of the API code. Typically, security APIs
are provided by a tamper-proof Hardware Security Module (HSM), but they may also
exist as a software library.
A security API can be viewed as a barrier between the trusted and untrusted areas
of a system. The goal of a security API is to provide the intended functionality while
ensuring that no sensitive data can ever exist in the untrusted area, regardless of how
calls to the API functions may be combined. A security API will typically take the form
of a key management API, with additional functions determined by the functionality
which the API is intended to provide. A key management API is a security API whose
sole purpose is to store and allow the use of cryptographic keys, while ensuring that
they do not become known to the applications which use the API.
Examples of security APIs include IBM’s Common Cryptographic Architecture
[CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide, Release 3.30] (a financial services API
which includes functions for PIN verification) and RSA’s PKCS #11 [PKCS #11] (a
vendor-neutral standard providing many common features). Non-examples include
TrueCrypt and IronKey — two systems which are used to encrypt sensitive information
to prevent it from falling into the hands of others. These are not security APIs because
they allow access to the sensitive data upon receipt of the correct password.
1.2 What is the “Problem”?
As noted in the previous section, the primary goal of a security API is to maintain the
confidentiality of sensitive information, regardless of the sequence of API calls that
a client application may make. A legitimate sequence of API calls which results in
the discovery of sensitive information is known as a security API attack [Bond, 2004,
(§3.1 ¶7–8)]. The “problem” is as follows:
For a given security API, how do we guarantee that no sequence of
function calls allows confidential information to become known?
Providing an answer to this question is the subject of this thesis.
Chapter 1. Introduction 10
1.2.1 Client-API Interaction Model
Although the focus of this thesis is on security APIs, it is necessary to consider how
such APIs will be presented to clients and how those clients will interact with the API.
The typical interaction model, which we follow, is shown in Fig. 1.1. In this model,
multiple client programs interact with a single API, with all client programs sharing a
common block of memory. The low memory is shared because our aim is to enforce
the boundary between the low and high parts of the system, rather than to enforce any









Figure 1.1: Client-API Interaction Model
The thick arrows represent permitted memory accesses: API code can access all
memory locations, whereas the client programs may only access the public memory
locations. This configuration follows from restrictions that exist in practice — with
hardware security devices, the high memory is inside a tamper-proof enclosure, and
with software APIs, access to the high memory locations is restricted by the compiler.
A consequence of this view is that, when dealing with software APIs, the security
properties only hold under the assumption that restricted memory locations are only
accessed programmatically, i.e., there is no physical probing of the memory chips.
The thin arrows represent API function calls that may exist within client programs.
For API functions which accept input parameters, a client program will be able to
provide any data item that it has access to. In our model, we assume that a client
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program has access to each and every data item that exists in the low part of the system.
Consequently, the API is responsible for enforcing the boundary between the high and
low parts of the system. We consider an API to be secure when the set of all data items
in the low part of the system represents an upper bound on the set of terms that any
client program is able to obtain information about. As such, our model assumes the
worst-case scenario, where each client program has access to every single data item
that it is permitted to. Our aim is to ensure that, even in this worst-case situation, a
client program cannot learn anything about data in the high part of the system.
1.3 Contributions
The research presented in this thesis provides the following contributions to the field
of security API analysis:
1. We provide a language and type system which enforces two desirable security
properties on any API which can be represented and is well-typed. Previously,
such a result would require API-specific proofs, while existing type-systems for
security APIs enforce weaker security properties.
2. We present a well-typed implementation of a secure API [Cachin and Chandran,
2009] and show how our type system enforces similar restrictions and provides
equivalent security guarantees. This can be viewed as both a validation of our
type system, and of the restrictions enforced by that API.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides a background to the theory which our research builds upon, as
well as an overview of similar work by others; Chapter 3 discusses the considerations
and motivations that led to the design of our type system; Chapter 4 defines the formal
system as well as the theorems which capture the security guarantees; Chapter 5 shows
how our system can be applied to a key management API recently proposed by Cachin
and Chandran, demonstrating how some of the security guarantees which they go to
great lengths to prove follow directly from the use of our approach. Our conclusions
are presented in Chapter 6, along with opportunities for future work. Full proofs of the
lemmas and theorems from Chapter 4 are contained in the appendix.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Multi-Level Security
Multi-level security (MLS) [Smith, 2006] is a method by which users of a system
(i.e., people and processes) can be restricted in what elements of that system they may
access (e.g., files, documents, services, etc.). Note that a user may also be an element,
as is often the case with system processes. To this end, a MLS system associates a
security label (or set of security labels) to each user and to each element. These labels
are (partially) ordered so as to define a security lattice. Figure 2.1 shows the ordered
security labels used by the UK Government [HMG Security Policy Framework].
The label associated with a user is termed their access level, and the label associated
with an element is termed its classification level. Users can access elements when
their access level is at least as high as the element’s classification level. For example,
using the security lattice shown in Fig. 2.1, a user whose clearance level is SECRET
may access all elements except those with the classification level TOP SECRET; and
elements whose classification level is SECRET may only be accessed by users with the
clearance level SECRET or TOP SECRET.
It may also be the case that a MLS system has additional labels which are used
to further restrict access on a need-to-know basis. For example, a US diplomat with
CLASSIFIED clearance would not be able to read RESTRICTED documents marked
with the additional label UK EYES ONLY. Incorporating such additional labels can be
achieved by means of a more complex security lattice, and therefore remains within
the scope of MLS. Figure 2.2 shows part of the semilattice corresponding to the UK
GPMS augmented with the need-to-know labels UK (UK eyes only) and CANUKUS
(Canadian, US and UK eyes only).
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Figure 2.1: The UK Government Protective Marking System (GPMS)
2.1.1 Bell-LaPadula Security Model
The standard approach used to enforce multilevel security is the Bell-LaPadula (BLP)
security model [Bell and LaPadula, 1973, 1976]. This model is concerned only with
confidentiality, although similar models exist for other security properties (e.g., the
Biba integrity model [Biba, 1977]). The BLP model comprises subjects and objects
(what we termed “users” and “elements” above), each of which have an associated
security level. The model also considers explicit need-to-know labels.
Two styles of system are dealt with: one where security classifications of objects,
security clearances of subjects, and any need-to-know restrictions are all static; and
another where access restrictions may be weakened (i.e., over time, the set of objects
that a subject can access never decreases). The model does not deal with systems where
access restrictions are strengthened. For both styles of system, Bell and LaPadula
define the same basic security theorem, which can be stated informally as follows:
BLP Basic Security Theorem
Any system which starts in a secure state and which proceeds via security-
preserving transitions will remain secure
The BLP model defines two mandatory security properties which must both hold for
transitions to be necessarily security-preserving. These properties are known as the
simple security property and the *-security property (read “star security property”),
and are defined informally as follows:
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Figure 2.2: Part of the security lattice produced by augmenting the UK Government
Protective Marking System (GPMS) with need-to-know labels
BLP Simple Security Property
A subject can observe an object only when the subject’s clearance level is at
least as high as the object’s classification level
BLP *-Security Property
A subject can modify an object only when the subject’s clearance level is equal
to or lower than the object’s classification level
The simple security property is often termed “no read up” and the *-security property
is often termed “no write down”.
In practice however, it is common for a subject with a high clearance level to want
to modify a low security object based solely upon data from other low security objects.
The BLP model permits such an operation to be carried out only by subjects with a
low clearance level, but by temporarily downgrading the subject’s clearance level, the
desired operations can be carried out. Of course, it is critical that any modifications to
the low security objects are indeed based solely upon low security data.
2.2 Information Flow
Information flow captures the relationship between data and the operations that are
carried out on that data. The operations generally include those which define the logical
control flow of a program, as well as the read and write operations which the BLP
model constrains. An insecure information flow exists when a particular piece of data
is dependent upon other, higher-confidentiality data.
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Information flow was originally formalised by Denning [Denning, 1975, 1976],
providing a mechanism for identifying and thus preventing insecure information flows
which arise from the logical execution of a program (i.e., conditional statements, reads
and writes). Flows which may arise from covert channels such as power usage, system
load, execution time, etc. are ignored.
There are two types of information flow: explicit and implicit. Explicit flows are
those in which a subject directly observes or modifies an object when they do not have
the necessary permissions. Implicit flows arise when the outcome of some operation
can be determined by code which has insufficient clearance to observe objects of that
sensitivity. For example:




This conditional statement leaks information about the confidential variable high into
the non-confidential variable low, even though no direct write-downs occur.
The security properties defined by the BLP model do actually prevent the implicit
flow which is shown in the above example, even though the definitions only talk about
restricting explicit flows. This is because the code may be permitted to read the value
of high, or modify the value of low, but not both. As a result, no clearance level exists
such that the program will satisfy both security properties in the BLP model.
Now consider the following example, where the clearance level of the program is
high:




With a high clearance level, this program snippet contravenes the *-security property,
and is therefore deemed insecure. As noted at the end of §2.1.1, we can avoid this
problem by allowing programs to temporarily reduce their clearance level. However,
we can also apply the same trick when executing the first example — temporarily
reduce the program’s clearance level in each of the branches. But this first example
contains an implicit information flow, therefore we must find a way to differentiate
between these two cases.
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Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [Fenton, 1974] was proposed as a mechanism for
preventing implicit flows arising from program control-flow. The context in which an
expression is being evaluated is assigned a security level, and this is used to control
what operations that expression is permitted to do. Specifically, the security level of
the context is the minimum level to which information may flow when evaluating any
of the subsequent branch expressions. When evaluation of the guard expression in
a conditional statement has completed, the security level of the context becomes the
least upper bound of its current level and that of the guard. In the first example given
above, the confidentiality level of the guard expression is high because it involves the
confidential variable high. As a result, to guarantee that no insecure information flows
exist, assignments to non-confidential variables cannot appear in either branch. Since
both branches contain such operations, the code snippet is insecure. In the second
example, the confidentiality level of the guard expression is low because it involves
the non-confidential variable low and the non-confidential constant 1. Since neither
branch includes assignments to variables with a confidentiality level less than that of
the guard expression, the code snippet is (correctly) deemed to be secure.
A detailed overview of the field of information-flow security from the early 1970s
to the early 2000s is given in [Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003], focusing on research which
makes use of static analysis methods.
2.2.1 Non-Interference
Introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [Goguen and Meseguer, 1982], non-interference
is a more general security property that implies a lack of information flows from high
confidentiality data to low confidentiality data. It was originally stated in terms of the
interactions between different users of a system:
Goguen and Meseguer’s General Statement of Non-Interference
One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is non-interfering with
another group of users if what the first group does with those commands has no
effect on what the second group of users can see
In the context of programs, non-interference means that confidential inputs cannot
influence public outputs. This is often generalised so that the program inputs include
the initial values of any program variables, and the outputs include the final values of
any program variables. Additionally, values created on-the-fly during the program’s
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execution are considered to be part of its inputs (all such values are assumed to be
generated in advance, then provided as input to the program which simply picks a
fresh one at the appropriate point during its execution).
2.3 Security Analyses of Cryptographic Systems
Approaches to analysing the security of cryptographic systems fall into one of two
camps: the first one uses a symbolic model of cryptography (as we will do), while
the other uses a computational model of cryptography. The symbolic model typically
assumes that encryption is perfect — that is, given a particular piece of ciphertext, no
information can be obtained about the plaintext that it contains without access to the
correct decryption key. In practice however, this assumption may not be valid [Pereira
and Quisquater, 2000].
The computational and symbolic analysis approaches were bridged by Abadi and
Rogaway [Abadi and Rogaway, 2000] who proved that, with the following restrictions
placed upon the encryption scheme, security in the symbolic model implies security in
the computational model:
1. The cipher must be repetition concealing: given any two non-equal ciphertexts,
it must be computationally infeasible to determine whether the same plain-text
was encrypted
2. The cipher must be which-key concealing: given some piece of ciphertext, it
must be computationally infeasible to determine which key was used
3. The cipher must be message-length concealing: given any two ciphertexts which
are non-equal, it must be computationally infeasible to determine whether or not
the encrypted plain-texts are of the same length
4. There must be no key-cycles: no key can encrypt a message or ciphertext which
required that key to produce
Abadi and Rogaway termed a cipher which possesses the first three properties type-0,
and show how ciphers which do not directly possess these properties can be used in
such a way so that the encryption scheme does.
Abadi and Rogaway achieve their main result by introducing the notion of patterns:
an expression that may contain parts which the adversary cannot decrypt. A pattern
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is obtained from a normal expression by replacing all ciphertexts that the adversary
cannot decrypt with . From the perspective of the adversary, two expressions are the
same when they reduce to the same pattern. That is, any differences that do exist are
hidden from the adversary. Consider the following example, where {m}k denotes the
encryption of the message m under the key k:
Kadv ::= k1 keys known to the adversary
(1) {{m}k2}k1 {}k1
(2) {{m}k1}k2  
(3) {m}k2 
The adversary cannot decrypt the second or third ciphertext and is therefore unable to
determine that those expressions are different from each other. However, the adversary
can decrypt the first ciphertext and thus determine that it is different from either of the
other two.
2.4 Type Systems
Type systems are a form of static analysis which guarantee that specific properties
hold of programs which are well-typed. In this thesis, we show how non-interference
can be enforced via a type system for programs that make use of certain cryptographic
primitives. Our type system builds upon previous work carried out by Dennis Volpano,
Geoffrey Smith and Cynthia Irvine [Volpano et al., 1996, Volpano and Smith, 1997],
and Eijiro Sumii and Benjamin Pierce [Sumii and Pierce, 2003], amongst others. A
comprehensive overview (up to 2003) of language-based approaches to information-
flow analysis is given in [Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003].
2.4.1 Non-Interference in a Simple Imperative Language
Volpano, Smith and Irvine [Volpano et al., 1996] were first to formulate a type system
that would guarantee non-interference for programs specified in a simple imperative
language with conditional branching. The type system was based upon Denning’s
approach [Denning, 1975, 1976] and also demonstrated the soundness of Denning’s
rules. The type system was later extended to include support for first-order procedure
calls [Volpano and Smith, 1997].




p ::= e | c Phrases
e ::= x | n | a | e + e′ | e − e′ | e = e′ | e < e′ |
proc(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c Expressions
c ::= e := e′ | e ; e′ | e(e1, e2, e3) | while e do c |
if e then c else c′ | letvar x := e in c | Commands
letproc x(in x1, inout x2, out x3) c in c′
τ ::= l Data types
π ::= τ | τ proc(τ1, τ2 var, τ3 acc) | τ cmd Procedure types
ρ ::= π | τ var | τ acc Phrase types
Figure 2.3: Syntax of Volpano, Smith and Irvine’s extended type system, from [Volpano
and Smith, 1997]1
Figure 2.3 presents the syntax for the extended version of Volpano, Smith and
Irvine’s type system.1 Typing judgements and evaluation relations, respectively, have
the form:
λ;γ ` p : ρ µ ` p⇒ µ′
where λ is a mapping from locations to types, γ is a mapping from variables to types,
and µ is a store. The maximum security level of values which may be stored in a
location a and variable x, respectively, are denoted as follows:
λ(a) γ(x)
They then prove a number of properties for well-typed terms. From a security
perspective, the important ones are as follows:
Volpano, Smith and Irvine’s Simple Security Lemma
If λ;γ ` e : τ then, for every a in e, λ(a) ≤ τ, and for every x free in e, γ(x) ≤ τ
1In the original presentation of the type system, locations are represented by l and security levels by
s. This has been changed here to match the notation we use in our type system.
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Volpano, Smith and Irvine’s Confinement Lemma
If λ ` c : τ cmd, µ ` c⇒ µ′, dom(λ) = dom(µ) and a is a location assigned to in
c, then either τ≤ λ(a) or µ(a) = µ′(a)
Volpano, Smith and Irvine’s Non-Interference Theorem
If λ ` c : ρ, µ1 ` c⇒ µ′1, µ2 ` c⇒ µ′2 and dom(λ) = dom(µ1) = dom(µ2) then, for
all a such that λ(a) ≤ τ, µ1(a) = µ2(a) implies µ′1(a) = µ′2(a)
The simple security lemma corresponds exactly with the simple security property from
the Bell-LaPadula model, and the confinement lemma corresponds to the *-property.
The non-interference theorem is a formal interpretation of Goguen and Meseguer’s
general statement (see §2.2.1).
2.4.2 Non-Interference and Cryptography
In [Sumii and Pierce, 2003], the authors present an extension to the simply typed
lambda calculus [Church, 1940] that includes primitives for encryption, decryption
and key generation, where encryption and decryption are assumed to be symmetric and
perfect. The syntax is shown in Fig. 2.4. Note that a decryption operation is followed
by one of two possible expressions — the first is for when the decryption succeeds,
and the latter is for when it fails. Consequently, there exists the implicit assumption
that it is possible to determine whether or not a decryption has failed.
The types present in the simply typed λ-calculus are extended with key[τ] and
bits[τ] — types for keys and ciphertexts, respectively. The type key[τ] is given to keys
which may encrypt expressions of type τ, and the type bits[τ] is given to ciphertext
containing a plain-text expression of type τ.
To prove the security properties of well-typed expressions, Sumii and Pierce define
a relation such that two related terms are behaviourally equivalent from the perspective
of the adversary. In other words, the adversary is unable to distinguish between two
related terms.
Sumii and Pierce’s Basic Logical Relation
• Two integers are related if and only if they are equal
• Two functions are related if and only if they return related output when
called with related inputs
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i Integers k Keys x Variables e Expressions
int opn(e1, . . ., en) Integer arithmetic operations
λx.e Function definition
e1e2 Function application
〈e1, . . . , en〉 Tuples
#i(e) ith element of a tuple
ini(e) ith element of a disjoint sum
case e of in1(x1)⇒ e1 . . . inn(xn)⇒ en Case split
new x in e Key generation
{e1}e2 Encryption
let {x}e1 = e2 in e3 else e4 Decryption
τ ::= int | τ1→ τ2 | τ1×·· ·× τ2 | τ1 + · · ·+ τ2 | key[τ] | bits[τ] Types
Figure 2.4: Syntax of Sumii and Pierce’s cryptographic λ-calculus, from [Sumii and
Pierce, 2003]
• Two tuples are related if and only if they are of the same length and each
pair of associated elements are related
• Two tagged values are related if and only if their tags are equal and their
bodies are related
• Two keys are related if and only if they are identical and public
• Two ciphertexts are related if and only if the same encryption key was used
to generate them, and either:
– the key is secret and is permitted to encrypt both plaintexts,2 or else
– the key is not secret and the two plaintexts are related
Given two copies of a particular program which differ only in the values of some
secret terms, that program preserves the confidentiality of those terms if and only if
the two copies are related to each other. In other words, the adversary is unable to
distinguish between the public outputs from the two instances of the program.
2The intent here is to ensure that the adversary cannot alter the set of values that a secret key will be
used to encrypt
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2.5 Indistinguishability
Sumii and Pierce’s definition for their basic logical relation states that two ciphertexts
are related if the keys used to create them are identical and both plaintexts may be
encrypted by that key.2 Implicit in this definition is the assumption that it is impossible
to determine the contents of some piece of ciphertext without knowing the key. This
property is known as repetition concealing (see [Abadi and Rogaway, 2000, §4.2] for
a brief overview) and is possessed by many common ciphers (e.g., DES in CBC and
CTR mode [Bellare et al., 1997]).
However, encryption breaks non-interference since ciphertext is dependent upon
the specific key and message used — changing the key or message alters the cipher-
text. To resolve this problem, various researchers (e.g., [Backes and Pfitzmann, 2002],
[Laud, 2001]) have utilised possibilistic non-interference [McCullough, 1988]. Infor-
mally, possibilistic non-interference states that two non-equal values can be considered
equal if the adversary is unable to determine that they correspond to distinct terms.
In relation to cryptographic operations, two non-equal ciphertexts can be considered
equal if the adversary is unable to determine that either a different encryption key has
been used, or a different plaintext has been encrypted. It therefore follows that it is
necessary for the cipher to be probabilistic.3 For purely deterministic ciphers, it is
necessary to use Goguen and Meseguer’s more strict definition where ciphertexts are
compared using bit-wise or structural equality.
Assuming that the cipher is repetition concealing and which-key concealing, two
ciphertexts of equal length can be distinguished in the following ways:
• If both ciphertexts can successfully be decrypted and the resulting plaintexts can
be distinguished
• If some key or procedure is known to correctly decrypt one ciphertext but not
the other
In cases where neither ciphertext can be decrypted and the plaintexts obtained, there is
no way to determine the existence of any differences and thus they must be considered
indistinguishable.
3Deterministic ciphers which first combine the message with some unique random value (i.e., the
initialisation vector) can be considered probabilistic since multiple encryptions with the same key and
message will produce different ciphertexts.
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2.5.1 Cryptographically-Masked Flows
Cryptographically-masked flows [Askarov et al., 2008] are semantically-equivalent to
the above property, and the authors provide a type system which enforces this property
for programs composed from a small imperative language with cryptographic primi-
tives. The type system shares a number of similarities with the research presented in
this thesis but, because the type system is targeted at security protocols, it does not
deal with function application. As we will demonstrate, API functions can be viewed
as the boundary between secure and insecure domains, across which no sensitive data
should flow. In [Askarov et al., 2008], this boundary is determined by the incoming
and outgoing channels from the communicating processes. Like much of the research
in this field, the authors consider only two security levels, and make a few simplifica-
tions based on this representation. This representation does not alter the validity of the
security proofs, but it does introduce an additional abstraction level when the system
being modelled comprises more than two security levels.
The computational soundness of this approach was shown to hold [Laud, 2008],
provided that the actual bit-string of a ciphertext is never used, and that no public
result is dependent upon the value of any secret encryption key. Indeed, these are two
restrictions which our type system is also required to enforce.
2.6 Contributions Revisited
Our primary contribution is a type system for expressions (i.e., programs) that include
calls to functions from some security API, and we prove that well-typed expressions
are non-interferent. We formally define this property in Definition 4.11, but it can be
stated informally as follows:
Non-Interferent Expression
An expression is non-interferent at some security level l when the execution
of that expression does not reveal any information about values whose security
level is higher than l
In other words, there are no information flows to l from higher security levels.
In Chapter 3, we describe and justify the components of our formal model as presented
in Chapter 4, then discuss the two security properties that our type system will enforce:
confidentiality and non-interference. The former property is implied by the latter, but
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is included explicitly as a means to introduce certain aspects of our type system more
easily. Our proof that a well-typed expression is non-interferent involves simulating
two related executions of that expression, where the only differences between each
execution is in those initial values which the adversary cannot obtain directly. We
then show that the adversary is incapable of distinguishing the two values produced.
Consequently, it is critical that the capabilities we infer on the adversary to distinguish
between any two values are realistic. §3.4 discusses these capabilities, which serves to
justify the formal definition of indistinguishability that we give in Definition 4.8.
In Chapter 4, we define an evaluation semantics for a simple imperative language with
primitives for symmetric encryption and decryption. The evaluation semantics are
intended to be very intuitive, to ensure that the power of our type system comes from
the type rules themselves, rather than from any clever program semantics.
We formally define what it means for an expression to be confidentiality-preserving
and non-interferent, in Definition 4.7 and Definition 4.11, respectively. Only once we
have these formal definitions, do we introduce our typing rules.
Our overall type system is influenced by a number of existing type systems for
analysing information-flow, e.g., [Volpano et al., 1996], [Volpano and Smith, 1997],
[Sumii and Pierce, 2001]. Differences between these systems and ours arise from the
adversary model that we use — since we are considering security APIs, the adversary
may be able to execute cryptographic operations where he does not have access to the
key nor the message.
Our second contribution is a demonstration that our type system can model practical
security APIs, imparting upon them the enforced security properties. In Chapter 5,
we present a well-typed implementation of the security API proposed by Cachin and
Chandran [Cachin and Chandran, 2009]. Consequently, the model is guaranteed to be
non-interferent without requiring additional proofs specific to that API. Our research
can therefore be viewed as a validation of the restrictions that Cachin and Chandran
enforce, in an API-agnostic manner.
One feature of our type system which simplifies the modelling process is that the
type rules are parameterised over any security level lattice which has well-defined top
and bottom elements. In contrast, security type systems typically use a security lattice
comprising only two levels (high > low), simplifying the theory but complicating any
application of those rules — you first have to determine the minimum security level
of values which are deemed confidential, then map all levels below that to ⊥ and all
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levels greater than or equal to it to >. If you want to verify security properties across
three or more levels, you will need to create multiple models.
2.7 Related Work
Security APIs are a fairly recent target for security researchers, e.g., [Anderson, 2000],
[Clulow, 2003], [Bond, 2004], [Youn, 2004], [Keighren, 2006], [Tsalapati, 2007], with
formal analyses often building upon existing methods for analysing security protocols.
However, while security protocols are generally stateless and define a fixed and finite
sequence of messages to exchange, security APIs are typically stateful and comprise
many functions, which may be called in any order and as often as desired. A recent
overview of the field of security API analysis is given in [Focardi et al., 2011].
2.7.1 Bengtson, Bhargavan, Fournet, Gordon and Maffeis
Bengtson et al. [Bengtson et al., 2008] present a type-checker for verifying security
properties of cryptographic protocols and access control systems written in F#. The
target code is annotated with refinement types that specify properties that should hold.
The theory behind the type-checker is presented as a form of the λ-calculus.
Refinement types are of the form {x:T |C}, where C is a first-order formula whose
free variables are a subset of {x}. A value v may be assigned this type when v has type
T and C holds when v is substituted for x in C. Refinements types are more powerful
than those in our type system, but due to the presence of first-order formulae, the type-
checking process may be undecidable.
The authors focus on authentication and authorisation properties, but their type
system is not limited to these areas. The specification and verification of first-order
formulae is done via assume and assert operations, respectively. All cryptographic
operations are handled implicitly via the abstract notion of sealing and unsealing.
The authors goal is to verify that an application is robustly safe. This means that,
even in the presence of an arbitrary adversary, none of the assert statements in the
application will fail.
2.7.2 Buttyán and Thong
Buttyán and Thong [Buttyán and Thong, 2008] analyse four commands from the API
for the VISA Security Module using the spi calculus [Abadi and Gordon, 1998] — an
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extension of the π-calculus [Milner et al., 1992] which includes primitives for shared-
key encryption and decryption. The π-calculus is a process calculi and therefore has
features for modelling concurrent systems. Consequently, the spi calculus has been
used to analyse security protocols [Abadi, 1999].
In the spi calculus, confidentiality can be couched in the following terms. Given
a process P(x), where x is some sensitive term that should remain secret, and an ad-
versary process Q, the input x is not leaked if Q cannot distinguish between the cases
where it is running in parallel with P(m) and the cases where it is running in parallel
with P(n), for all m and n. The confidentiality of x is protected through the use of dy-
namically generated Secret terms (e.g., keys and nonces). Dynamic generation of some
secret terms is a necessary requirement since probabilistic encryption is modelled via
the inclusion of a random confounder in the plaintext message. Without confounders,
two ciphertexts generated from the same key and message pair would be equal and
thus the adversary could easily determine whether or not two ciphertexts contained the
same message. Buttyán and Thong encode a security API as follows:
• Each API function is modelled as a separate process
• A distinct public communication channel exists for each API function (i.e., the
parameters of a function call are sent on a dedicated channel).
• All output from API calls are sent on a single public channel, cuser
• The API comprises the parallel composition of the infinite replication of the
function processes
• The adversary’s initial knowledge is output on cuser immediately before the API
process
• Ciphertexts contain the plaintext message as well as a “tag” denoting the mes-
sage type
Buttyán and Thong are forced to use tagged ciphertexts because key types in their
system do not include the type of data on which a key may be used, and because
messages sent to the API cannot be uniquely determined on structure alone (if they
could, then there would be no need for a separate channel to be associated with each
API function).
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2.7.3 Centenaro, Focardi, Luccio and Steel
Centenaro et al. [Centenaro et al., 2009] present a type system to prove the security
of PIN processing APIs, which naturally must declassify some information about the
value of the confidential PIN (i.e., whether or not the input PIN matches the actual
PIN). The authors’ main result is that well-typed API functions are robust [Myers
et al., 2006] and, if no declassification is performed, non-interferent. Robustness is
a weakening of non-interference that allows for declassification, but only where the
adversary cannot influence what is declassified.
The enforcement of robustness is achieved through the use of MACs (Message
Authentication Codes) which prevent the adversary from being able to tamper with
the function input parameters. Since the adversary cannot modify individual input
parameters, he cannot affect whether declassification occurs, nor affect what values
are declassified.
Similarly to our research and that of others, the type for cryptographic keys in-
cludes the maximum security level of the data which that key may be used to encrypt,
and the type of ciphertexts includes the type of the plaintext within. However, the
type system does not deal with decryption failure — such evaluations are defined to be
non-terminating. This removes a valuable side-channel that the adversary may use to
distinguish between two ciphertexts, and one which we include in our research.
2.7.4 Centenaro, Focardi and Luccio
Centenaro, Focardi and Luccio [Centenaro et al., 2012] provide a type system for
analysing the key management operations of PKCS #11. The type system makes a
distinction between key wrapping/unwrapping and regular encryption/decryption, as
well as having rules for deriving new keys from existing keys. The authors prove that
their type system enforces two security properties:
1. A sensitive value will not become known by the adversary as a result of executing
well-typed API functions
2. An always-sensitive key is never known by the adversary, nor will any new key
derived from an always-sensitive key become known by the adversary
The first property corresponds to confidentiality and is explicitly mentioned in the
PKCS #11 documentation, while the latter corresponds to integrity for those values
which are considered to be high-integrity.
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To enforce these security properties, the type system requires that keys are not
used for conflicting operations (e.g., key wrapping and arbitrary decryption). In other
words, permitted combinations of roles in PKCS #11 are mapped to distinct key types
which are proven to enforce the desired security properties. The type system that we
present in this thesis is intended to provide similar restrictions, but where the various
key types are defined by whatever security level lattice is used.
In addition to achieving the security result via enforcing restrictions on the usage
of each key, the authors also present a novel solution whereby a new key is produced
for each type of use, derived from the original key using some sensitive seed value.
This results in the same separation of use, but done in a way that is transparent to the
end user of the API. It should be noted however that the derivation mechanism must be
secure, so as to avoid attacks which convert keys to a different type, such as has been
shown to exist with IBM’s CCA API [Bond, 2000].
Chapter 3
Development of K
In this chapter, we build up an informal description of our type system — called K —
and in doing so, provide justification for the design decisions that have been made in
the course of its development. This will serve as a system primer for the reader, before
the formal definitions and properties are presented in the next chapter.
3.1 System Framework
The primary aim of our research is to provide a mechanism for ensuring the absence of
insecure information flows in security API implementations, as well as programs that
include calls to those functions. We do this by defining a syntax and accompanying
type system for both API implementations and client programs, such that well-typed
instances are guaranteed to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive data and be free
from insecure information flows arising as a result of the logical program control flow.
We restrict ourselves to well-typed client programs for two reasons. The first is
that it allows us to focus on preventing API designers from creating an API that leaks
sensitive information even when used correctly. The second is that there are many
scenarios where the client code will be well-typed. Examples of the latter are software
APIs where client code is run through a compiler than can enforce typing, or where the
API code itself is able to determine at runtime what type a function input has (e.g., via
cryptographically-bound tagging).
By considering only well-typed programs, our type system may not prevent attacks
that rely on type-confusion. That is, where sensitive data is leaked as a result of API
functions being called with parameters which are of a different type than expected.
Section 4.6 gives an example of such attacks and discusses this problem in more detail.
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3.1.1 Data Model
In K, data items are termed values, as they are a canonical representation of some
particular piece of information. A value may be primitive or compound — a primitive
value is the most basic form of value, whereas a compound value is built up from other
compound or primitive values.
The primitive values that we include in K are as follows:
• Boolean Constants: TRUE, FALSE
These represent fixed bit-strings which denote the Boolean values TRUE and
FALSE, respectively.
• Arbitrary Constants: c
These represent fixed bit-strings which cannot be used to encrypt other values.
• Cryptographic Keys: k
These represent fixed bit-strings which can be used with a symmetric cipher to
encrypt other values, and decrypt ciphertext.
• Location Identifiers: a
These represent the address of a memory location which stores some particular
value. Knowledge of a location identifier does not imply knowledge of, or ability
to obtain, the value which is currently stored in that location.
We also include the following compound values:
• Ciphertext: ctxt(n, k, v)
These represent the result of encrypting the (primitive or compound) value v
with the key k. The encryption algorithm is required to be a type-0 symmetric
cipher, and we represent the probabilistic nature of such ciphers by including a
fresh confounder n in each ciphertext produced.
We do not include numbers in K, therefore the only comparison operation which may
be carried out between two values is a bit-wise equality test. In our abstract semantics,
this corresponds to structural equivalence.
3.1.2 Code Phrases
In K, both client code and API code are drawn from the same set of code phrases,
termed expressions. We believe that placing artificial restrictions upon either client
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code or API code would limit the accuracy and applicability of our approach. Instead,
differences between client and API code arise solely from the access rights assigned to
each, i.e., API code executes with greater privileges than client code.
The expressions that client code and API code are drawn from are as follows:
• Symmetric Encryption: senc(ek, em)
If ek evaluates to a key k, and em evaluates to a value v, then senc(ek, em) evaluates
to the ciphertext ctxt(n, k, v), where n is a fresh confounder (random value). This
represents the probabilistic encryption of v with k. Cryptographic operations are
discussed in more detail in §3.2.
• Symmetric Decryption: try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2
First, ek and ec are fully evaluated, producing vk and vc, respectively. If vk is a key
and vc is ciphertext of the form ctxt(n, vk, v), v is substituted for x in e1, which is
subsequently evaluated. Otherwise, e2 is evaluated (with no substitution carried
out). We therefore require that the cryptographic algorithm is able to detect when
a decryption operation fails. The reasons for the decryption operation being of
this form are discussed further in §3.1.3.
• Function Calls: f (e1, . . ., en)
Function calls are the sole means by which client code interfaces with API code.
Functions may be internal to the API, callable by client code, or internal to the
client code. From a security perspective, the only differences between these
forms are the security levels of the input and output values, and the permissions
with which the function body executes. For example, client functions will be
executed with fewer permissions and access rights than API functions.
• Scoped Variable Declaration: let x = e1 in e2
First, e1 is fully evaluated, producing the value v. Next, v is substituted for x in
the expression e2, which is subsequently evaluated to give the overall result.
• Conditional Branching: if e1 then e2 else e3
First, e1 is fully evaluated, producing v1. If v1 is TRUE then e2 is subsequently
evaluated, otherwise e3 is subsequently evaluated.
• Equality Testing: e1 == e2
After e1 and e2 have been fully evaluated, they are compared using structural
equality, corresponding to bit-wise equality in practice. If they are equal, this
expression evaluates to TRUE, otherwise it evaluates to FALSE.
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• Assignment: e1 := e2
If e1 evaluates to a location identifier, then the associated location is updated to
contain the value to which e2 evaluates, v. The overall expression evaluates to v.
• Dereferencing: *e
If e evaluates to a location identifier, then *e evaluates to the value currently
stored in that location. To simplify our analysis slightly, we require that location
are initialised with some default value to ensure that the result of any dereference
operation is well defined.
3.1.3 Decryption Failure
The symmetric decryption expression directly handles the case when the decryption
key is incorrect — a similar approach to that taken in other systems that deal with
cryptography, such as [Sumii and Pierce, 2001]. One reason for doing this is that the
success or otherwise of a decryption operation cannot be determined in advance since
the choice of decryption key and/or ciphertext may be controlled by the adversary.
However, this does necessitate that the errors are handled immediately; we could have
used a general error-handling expression similar to the try-catch block common in
programming languages such as Java. Consider the following example, where vk is
some confidential key and a corresponds to some public location:
try
let x = (b := a) in




After this snippet of code has been executed, a will contain the value TRUE if and only
if the decryption operation succeeded. Consequently, there is an information flow from
the high part of the system (containing the confidential key vk) to the low part of the
system (containing the public location a).
To prevent this indirect information flow, it is necessary to prevent any assignment
to low locations anywhere within the try-catch statement after the decryption. This
restriction is cleaner and more explicit if the above code snippet must be written as
follows:
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let x = (b := a) in




The try-catch construct does not confer any additional expressivity on the language, but
rather helps to simplify exception-throwing and exception-handling code. Including
the try-catch construct in K would serve only to complicate the proofs. For this reason,
we instead require the decryption operation to handle failed decryption immediately.
3.1.4 Programs
The main aspect of our interaction model is the distinction between privileged API
code (running inside a tamper-proof hardware security module, or with higher system
privileges) and restricted client code (running on any other device, or with basic system
privileges). A program comprises client code plus the API code for each corresponding
function call that exists in the client code, as shown in Fig. 3.1. Consequently, the
overall execution trace will switch between restricted and privileged blocks of code
whenever there is a call to an API function. With respect to confidentiality, an insecure
information flow will exist if the data returned by any API function call allows the
client to discover information about a sensitive data item. We aim to prevent such
insecure information flows from arising, thus preserving the invariant that the client
program only has information about data in the low part of the system. A minimum
requirement for this is that any API function which may be called by client code should
not return sensitive data items directly.
As defined by our interaction model, client code may directly access any data item
in the low part of the system, and API code may directly access data items in both
the low and high parts of the system.1 Similarly to before, these access assumptions
are upper bounds on what will happen in practice. This follows from our interaction
model, where client code is prevented from directly accessing data items in the high
part of the system.
Both client code and API code may contain recursive function calls, therefore it is
possible for a program execution to never terminate. The potential for non-termination
1For data items corresponding to ciphertext, the client or API code may not necessarily be able to
obtain the data item which has been encrypted.
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Privileged CodeNon-Privileged Code
let x = f(v1, ..., vN) in e1
v
f(x1, ..., xN) = e
e     v
e1[x/v]    v2
Figure 3.1: Overview of a Program in our Interaction Model
introduces a side-channel which may give rise to insecure information flows (e.g., if
termination is dependent upon the value of some sensitive data item). We ignore this
particular side-channel, focusing instead on side-channels which arise as a result of
program flow (i.e., conditional branching).
3.1.5 Richer Security Lattices
So far, we have only considered the partitioning of data items into two parts. The
formal system that will be presented in the next chapter is defined with respect to an
arbitrary security lattice. A richer lattice allows for restrictions to be enforced beyond
those which are necessary to ensure the fundamental security properties that we want.
For example, we can enforce user-based restrictions on keys, thereby preventing one
client from being able to encrypt the secret keys belonging to another client. Such
restrictions could be achieved as follows:
• Security levels include a component corresponding to a set of users who are
permitted to obtain the associated data item. For example, (H, {alice,bob})
• The security level (l1,U1) is dominated by the security level (l2,U2) iff l1≤ l2 and
U2⊆U1. For example, (H, {bob}) dominates (L, {alice,bob}), while (L, {alice})
and (L, {bob}) are incomparable.
Chapter 3. Development of K 35
• The clearance level of user u is (lu, {u}).
PKCS #11 [PKCS #11] is an example of a real-world security API where a richer lattice
can enforce additional properties that the API is designed to uphold. In PKCS #11
it should not be possible to encrypt keys marked as unextractable. This means that
sensitive keys are split into two sub-groups: those which can be encrypted and those
which cannot. This naturally lends itself to using a security lattice comprising three
levels.
In Chapter 5, when we apply our type system to the security API presented in
[Cachin and Chandran, 2009], we employ a security lattice comparable to the one
outlined above.
3.2 Cryptographic Operations
We consider two basic cryptographic operations in our system: symmetric encryption
and symmetric decryption. Other operations such as public key cryptography, digital
signatures, and key derivation are left as future work. We require certain standard
properties of the symmetric cryptographic operations:
1. The cipher is which-key concealing, repetition concealing, and message-length
concealing (i.e., a type-0 cipher)
2. Decryption failure can be detected
The properties of a type-0 cipher are intended to guarantee that no information about
the key or message used to create some piece of ciphertext can be discovered by only
looking at the ciphertext. In our adversary model, information about the key or mes-
sage in such ciphertexts may be obtained when either one is public (as opposed to
in the typical adversary model for security protocol analysis where it would be true
whenever the key was confidential). This follows from our assumption that all public
values may become known to the adversary, therefore providing a means to determine
when two encrypted public messages are different. Additionally, the adversary in our
model may be able to determine when two ciphertexts containing public messages and
created with different confidential keys are different. This is because API functions
may exist which decrypt such messages. The ways in which an adversary may tell
apart two ciphertexts are discussed further in §3.4.
Chapter 3. Development of K 36
Real-world ciphers, such as AES and DES (in CBC mode), are both which-key
concealing and repetition concealing. Consequently, we need only ensure that an API
implementation which uses such a cipher is message-length concealing when encrypt-
ing a confidential message with a confidential key. Provided the implementation never
encrypts arbitrary length confidential messages, we can add padding to messages prior
to encryption and our cipher will be message-length concealing.2 The second property
holds when encrypted messages have a known structure, such as the concatenation of
the message and a hash value or checksum.
3.2.1 Confounders
Our analysis approach will use the symbolic model, as opposed to the computational
model. However, since we assume that the encryption cipher is probabilistic, we need
to capture this feature. Abadi and Rogaway showed that this can be achieved by using
confounders [Abadi and Rogaway, 2000]. Confounders are random values that are
freshly generated every time an encryption operation is carried out:
a := senc(k1, v1); a = ctxt(n1, k1, v1)
b := senc(k1, v1); b = ctxt(n2, k1, v1)
c := senc(k2, v2);
 
c = ctxt(n3, k2, v2)
d := a; d = ctxt(n1, k1, v1)
Evaluating the code snippet on the left will result in the locations a through d
containing the ciphertexts shown on the right. The contents of locations a and d are
equal, and the contents of locations b and c are different to the contents of all other
locations. Note that, when a piece of ciphertext is decrypted, the confounder is ignored.
This example shows that, given any pair of non-equal ciphertexts, we cannot say
anything about whether or not the keys and messages are the same — the exact same
property possessed by type-0 ciphers.
What may not be immediately apparent however, is that we must make a certain
assumption about values in our system. This assumption is not unique to our system
or analysis method, rather it arises from our use of the symbolic model. The symbolic
model assumes that two values are equal if and only if they have the same structure.
For non-compound values like keys, this means that every key identifier (e.g., k1, k2,
etc.) represents a different bit-string. For ciphertexts, this means that two non-equal
2As security APIs typically protect sensitive cryptographic keys, or fixed-structure data items such
as passwords, it is reasonable to assume this property of the systems being analysed.
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ciphertexts always correspond to different bit-strings. In reality though, it is possible
for two different key-message pairs to produce the same ciphertext. However, for two
meaningful messages, it is a highly unlikely possibility and therefore is not considered
a limitation when using the symbolic model.
3.3 Security Properties
In this section, we discuss the two main security properties that our system is designed
to enforce: confidentiality and non-interference. Confidentiality is concerned with di-
rect information flows, and non-interference is concerned with indirect information
flows (although non-interference must also consider direct flows). Implicit flows arise
from side-channels such as program control flow, execution time, resource consump-
tion, etc..
3.3.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the most intuitive information-flow property, and can be stated infor-
mally as follows:
A data item with an associated security level of l should never become
known to principals whose clearance level is less than l
Bell and LaPadula showed that it was possible to enforce confidentiality in a multi-level
secure system by limiting just the read and write operations in that system [Bell and
LaPadula, 1973]. For example, a high program should never write high data into a low
location, and a low program should never be able to read the contents of a high location.
We enforce these restrictions in our system through the typing rules for assignment and
dereferencing.
3.3.2 Non-Interference
Non-interference is a more subtle information-flow property that covers both explicit
and implicit flows, which can be stated informally as follows:
For a given security level l, changes to data items whose associated
security level is greater than or equal to l should have no observable
effect upon data items whose associated security level is less than l










Figure 3.2: The Adversary Model for Indistinguishability
The following example shows an insecure information flow, arising from program con-
trol flow, which breaks the non-interference property:




In this example, the low location l will contain 1 whenever the high value h equals 1.
Consequently, there is an indirect information flow from h to l. This example breaks
the non-interference property because there exists a pair of values for h which result in
the contents of l being different, e.g., 0 and 1.
To prove that a system is non-interferent, we simulate two related executions of
that system. This means we require an adversary model which takes into account two
instances of the API, as shown in Fig. 3.2. The adversary interacts with the API in
one of two configurations, and an API is said to be non-interferent when the adversary
is unable to determine which of the two instances he is interacting with. The two
instances of the API differ in the high values that are present in the system; all low
values are equal. For example, each API may contain different confidential keys, and
the API is non-interferent when this difference is transparent to the adversary. If this
difference is visible to the adversary then this information may enable him to discover
the cryptographic value of those confidential keys.
To prove that an API is non-interferent in K, we execute a program against each
instance of the API and show that the adversary is unable to tell apart the two results
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and final low memories. The comparison relation that the adversary uses to tell apart
the two results is discussed in §3.4.
Indirect information flows like the one above can be prevented by restricting the
assignments that may be made within the branches of a conditional test. For example,
if the test involves high values, the branches may only modify the contents of high
locations. In our system, we must also restrict function return values, since they may
depend upon high data items.
3.4 Indistinguishability
To determine whether or not a particular program is non-interferent, it is necessary to
compare two executions of that program — where data items in the high part of the
system differ in each one. If the adversary can tell the two results apart, then there has
been an insecure information flow from the high part of the system to the low part.
We now describe and justify the comparison relation used by the adversary. The
formal relation is given in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values); the relations
outlined below show how this formal relation was reached. In the sections which
follow, we write v1∼i v2 to denote the comparison of values v1 and v2, where i is
different for each subsequent version of the relation. In all cases, the adversary is
unable to tell apart the two values when the relation holds.
3.4.1 Equality
The simplest check that the adversary can do is just to look at the two results and see
if they are equal or not. This corresponds to structural equality in our abstract model
of the system, and bit-wise equality in reality. This gives us the following comparison
relation:
v1∼1 v2 iff v1 = v2
However, this is too simple a relation to use as it does not sufficiently deal with the
comparison of ciphertext results.
3.4.2 Offline Decryption
In our system, where program results may be ciphertext, it is unrealistic to have an
adversary who just does basic bit-string comparisons. Instead, we want to consider an
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adversary who is able to decrypt any ciphertexts that he knows the correct key for.
To demonstrate how the comparison relation should deal with ciphertexts, let us
consider the following examples, where Kadv is the set of keys known to the adversary:
• ctxt(n1, k1, v1) and ctxt(n2, k2, v2) where k1, k2 ∈ Kadv
Here, the adversary can correctly decrypt both ciphertexts, thereby obtaining v1
and v2. There are two ways in which the adversary would be able to tell the
ciphertexts apart. The first is if he can tell apart v1 and v2; the second is if k1
and k2 are non-equal. In the first case, the adversary knows that the messages are
different, and in the second case, he knows that a different key has been used to
create each ciphertext.
• ctxt(n1, k1, v1) and ctxt(n2, k2, v2) where k1, k2 6∈ Kadv
Here, the adversary is unable to decrypt either ciphertext. Consequently, since
we assume a type-0 cipher, the adversary cannot obtain any information about
the keys or messages in either one. As such, the ciphertexts can be viewed as
random bit-strings. These bit-strings will be equal if the confounders are equal,
and will be non-equal if the confounders are different.3 In both cases however,
since no sensitive information can be obtained by the adversary, we want the
comparison relation to hold (i.e., the adversary cannot tell the ciphertexts apart).
• ctxt(n1, k1, v1) and ctxt(n2, k2, v2) where k1 ∈ Kadv and k2 6∈ Kadv
Here, the adversary is able to correctly decrypt one ciphertext, but not the other.
As such, he knows that a different key has been used to create each one, and
therefore that they are different. The ability to determine that one ciphertext
has been correctly decrypted but not the other follows from our requirement that
we can determine whether or not the correct key has been used in a decryption
operation (see §3.2).
These examples show when two potentially non-equal pieces of ciphertext can or
cannot be told apart. As a direct result of the second example, our comparison relation
equates more pairs of results than those which are bit-wise equal. This follows from
our desire to capture the information-hiding capabilities of probabilistic encryption
ciphers.
3The probabilistic nature of the encryption cipher makes it statistically unlikely that two different
encryption operations will produce equal ciphertexts.
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Our comparison relation is now defined as follows:
v1∼2 v2 when v1 = v2
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼2 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when k1, k2 6∈ Kadv
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼2 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when k1, k2 ∈ Kadv, k1 = k2 and v1∼2 v2
3.4.3 API Functions
The relation that we will use when comparing the outputs from two executions of a
particular program will be a formal version of the one shown in §3.4.2. However, an
alternative version of the relation is necessary when we allow the adversary to make
calls to arbitrary API functions. The differences between the previous relation and
the one given below stem from the fact that, in general, API functions will be able to
carry out successful decryption operations using a larger set of keys (i.e., all the keys
known to the adversary, plus some or all of those from the high part of the system).
To demonstrate this further, consider the following examples, where Kapi is the set of
keys which are usable in decryption operations by API code, and L is the set of all data
items in the low part of the system:
• ctxt(n1, k1, v1) and ctxt(n2, k2, v2) where k1, k2 ∈ (Kapi\Kadv) and v1, v2 ∈ L
Here, the adversary is unable to decrypt the two pieces of ciphertext himself.
However, it is possible that he can use a sequence of API calls to obtain v1
and/or v2. In the general case, we cannot know what functions a particular API
will provide. As such, we must assume the worst case where the adversary is
able to use one or more API functions to obtain both v1 and v2.
The adversary can therefore distinguish the two ciphertexts when the process
required to obtain v1 is different to that which is required to obtain v2, or when
v1 and v2 are themselves distinguishable.
• ctxt(n1, k1, v1) and ctxt(n2, k2, v2) where k1, k2 ∈ (Kapi\Kadv) and v1, v2 6∈ L
Here, the adversary is unable to decrypt the two pieces of ciphertext himself and,
because the messages are not low, a secure API will not allow the adversary to
obtain them.4 Consequently, the adversary will be unable to tell apart these two
ciphertexts.
4We can assume that the API is secure in this relation because it will not be used to compare outputs,
only to restrict inputs. That is, if the API is not actually secure, then a program will exist that produces
output which can be distinguished based on the relation given in §3.4.2. See the discussion which
follows for more details.
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The ability for the adversary to use API functions to tell apart data items is equivalent
to saying that the adversary can use any client program to try and tell them apart. In
other words, the adversary can use a single client program, taking a single input, and
execute it twice; once with one data item and once with the other. Since there are no
restrictions on the length of such programs, the final comparison of the two program
outputs can be done using the relation described in §3.4.2.
Additionally, this means that program inputs will only be considered the same if
they satisfy the relation given in this section. This relation is as follows, where the sets
are the same as previously defined:
v1∼3 v2 when v1 = v2
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼3 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when k1, k2 6∈ Kadv and v1, v2 6∈ L
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼3 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when v1, v2 ∈ L , k1 = k2 and v1∼3 v2
It is straightforward to show that two results satisfying this comparison relation also
satisfy the relation given in §3.4.2:
• In the first case, the result is immediate since the same case exists in the previous
relation.
• In the second case, we have k1, k2 6∈ Kadv and this is sufficient to satisfy the
second case of the previous relation.
• In the third case, we have k1 = k2 and v1∼3 v2. Since the symbolic model requires
that data items are distinct, it must be the case that k1 and k2 are either both in
Kadv or are both not in Kadv. In the former instance, the third case of the previous
relation is satisfied, and in the latter instance, the second case of the previous
relation is satisfied.
3.4.4 Observation Levels
The comparison relations given in the previous sections involve the set of keys known
to the adversary, Kadv. We can over-approximate this set with KL, the set of all keys
in the low part of the system. Recall that a key is in KL if the security label associated
with it is dominated in the security lattice by the adversary’s observation level (i.e., the
adversary is permitted to know that key). Consequently, we can check whether or not
a key is in the set KL by looking at the security level associated with it.
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If l is the observation level of the adversary, then the security level of every data
item in KL is less than or equal to l. We can therefore state the comparison relation
from §3.4.3 as follows:
v1∼3 v2 when v1 = v2
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼3 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when lvl(k1) 6≤ l, lvl(k2) 6≤ l, lvl(v1) 6≤ l and
lvl(v2) 6≤ l
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼3 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when k1 = k2, lvl(v1) ≤ l, lvl(v2) ≤ l and v1∼3 v2
Similarly, the comparison relation from §3.4.2 can be stated as follows:
v1∼2 v2 when v1 = v2
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼2 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when lvl(k1) 6≤ l and lvl(k2) 6≤ l
ctxt(n1, k1, v1)∼2 ctxt(n2, k2, v2) when lvl(k1) ≤ l, lvl(k2) ≤ l, k1 = k2 and v1∼2 v2
Chapter 4
Formal System
In this chapter we present the formal model of our type system. Section 4.1 gives the
abstract syntax, Section 4.2 describes the evaluation relation, Section 4.3 outlines the
major security properties which it is intended to enforce, and Section 4.4 defines the
typing rules and associated lemmas. The proofs of the main security properties are
presented in Section 4.5, with all other proofs given in Appendix A.
4.1 Abstract Syntax
We define the following (countably infinite) disjoint sets of identifiers, with elements
of each denoted by the specified meta-variable:
l ∈ L Security labels
c ∈ C Constants
k ∈ K Keys
a ∈ A Memory addresses (locations)
f ∈ F Function identifiers
x ∈ X Variables
n ∈ N Nonces
The set L defines the possible security labels which may be associated with terms in
the system (e.g., {H, L} or {TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED,
UNCLASSIFIED}). We obtain a security level lattice (L ,≤) by giving a partial order
on L such that there exists a least element, denoted ⊥, and a greatest element, denoted
>. The ordering relation ≤ must be transitive and reflexive, as we rely upon these
properties in many of the proofs presented in this thesis. The lattice operations, g and
f, are assumed to follow the standard semantics for least upper bound and greatest
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lower bound, respectively. From this point onwards, we assume that there exists an
unspecified but fixed security level lattice which has the required properties. Constants
and keys both correspond to arbitrary but fixed bit-strings, with constants representing
regular data items and keys able to be used for encryption and decryption purposes.
Memory addresses correspond to arbitrary locations in memory, of no particular size
but large enough to hold each value stored in them. We consider memory addresses
to be unrelated to each other, and therefore do not model low-level operations such as
pointer arithmetic. This view follows from our intention that K focuses on preventing
information leaks which arise from the logical execution path of a particular program
with respect to a given API. By abstracting away certain properties of the underlying
physical system, we limit the complexity of our system to just those areas where it is
necessary to study the problem of interest. Nonces represent confounders and allow us
to represent non-deterministic encryption. Confounders were first introduced in [Abadi
and Rogaway, 2000], and the motivation behind their use was discussed in §3.2.1.
We consider systems (i.e., programs) comprising an API definition and a single
executable block of code, where the bodies of API functions and the executable code
are drawn from the same set of expressions, as defined by the following term grammar:
v ::= c | a | k | ctxt(n, k, v) | TRUE | FALSE Values
e ::= v | x | senc(e, e) | try sdec(x, x) = x in e else e
| if x then e else e | e == e | e := e | *e | f (−→e )
Expressions
d ::= d ; l c | d ; l k | d ; l a | d ; l f (−→x ) {e} | ε API definition
p ::= (d, e) Program
An API definition is a possibly empty sequence of constant, key, memory address and
function definitions. Constant and key definitions comprise an identifier preceded by
the security label which that term should be associated with. Definitions of memory
addresses also comprise an identifier preceded by a security label, but here the security
label denotes the maximum level of values which may be stored in the corresponding
location; the security level associated with the identifier is ⊥. Function definitions
comprise the function identifier, a possibly empty list of parameter variables and an
expression corresponding to the function body. Functions definitions are also preceded
by a security label which denotes a lower bound on the security level of the return value
and of any modified locations. This lower bound marks the clearance level below
which the function call should have no observable effect.
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4.1.1 Definitions
We now present some standard definitions that we make use of in this chapter.
Definition 4.1 (Substitution).
The substitution of a value v for a variable x within an expression e, written [v/x]e
is defined inductively by the following rules:
[v /x]v′ = v′
[v /x]x = v
[v /x]x′ = x′ (x′ 6= x)
[v /x]let x′ = e1 in e2 = let x′ = [v /x]e1 in [v /x]e2 (x′ 6= x)
[v /x]senc(ek, em) = senc([v /x]ek, [v /x]em)
[v /x]try sdec(ek, ec) = x′ in e1 else e2
= try sdec([v /x]ek, [v /x]ec) = x′ in [v /x]e1 else [v /x]e2 (x′ 6= x)
[v /x]if e1 then e2 else e3 = if [v /x]e1 then [v /x]e2 else [v /x]e3
[v /x]*e = *[v /x]e
[v /x]e1 := e2 = [v /x]e1 := [v /x]e2
[v /x] f (e1, . . ., en) = f ([v /x]e1, . . ., [v /x]en)
Values are unchanged by substitution since, by definition, they cannot contain any
variables. Other expressions have the substitution applied to their sub-expressions.
Note that, for function calls, no substitution is done in the body of the function. The
substitution of variables within function bodies is restricted to those variables defined
in the function parameter list, rather than being ruled out altogether.
The x 6= x′ restriction in the ‘let’ and ‘try sdec’ cases is easily ensured by the
following convention, which allows us to rename any bound variable to a free identifier,
provided that all occurrences of that variable are similarly renamed:
Convention 4.2 (Alpha Renaming).
Terms that differ only in the names of bound variables are interchangeable in all
contexts.
For example, to substitute v′ for x in the expression let x = v in x, we first rename the
variable in the let expression to x′ then proceed with [v′/x](let x′ = v in x′), yielding the
result let x′ = v in x′.
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Definition 4.3 (Free Variables).
The set of free variables of an expression e, written FV(e), is defined as follows:
FV(v) = /0 FV(let x = e1 in e2) = FV(e1) ∪ (FV(e2) \ {x})




FV(senc(ek, em)) = FV(ek) ∪ FV(em)
FV(try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2) = FV(ek) ∪ FV(ec) ∪ (FV(e1) ∪ FV(e2) \ {x})
FV(if e1 then e2 else e3) = if FV(e1) then FV(e2) else FV(e3)
FV(e1 := e2) = FV(e1) ∪ FV(e2) FV(*e) = FV(e)
Definition 4.4 (Closed Expression).
An expression e is defined to be closed when FV(e) = /0.
4.2 Evaluation Relation
Expressions (and therefore client programs) are evaluated with respect to an evaluation
environment ∆ and evaluation context Π:
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉 Evaluation relation
The left and right side of an evaluation relation will be referred to as an execution
state, or simply a state. The evaluation context is a finite set of variable to value
mappings, and the evaluation environment is a tuple comprising a finite set of value to
security level mappings, a finite set of function definitions, a potentially infinite set of
confounders, and a store:
Π ::= {xi 7→ vi | i ∈ 1..n} Evaluation context
∆ ::= (L,F,N, φ) Evaluation environment
(Π, ∆) Evaluation domain
The four components comprising the evaluation environment have the following forms:
L ::= {v : l | v ∈ {c, k, a}} Security levels mapping
F ::= f (x1, . . ., xn) = e : l,F | ε Function definitions
N ::= n,N | ε Confounders
φ ::= (a 7→ v), φ | ε Store
The set of security level mappings in the initial evaluation environment is generated
from the definition of the API that the expression is to be evaluated against. This set
only contains mappings for constants, keys and memory locations because the security
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0 = default value for x
(ε, e) ({x 7→ 0 | x ∈ FV(e)}, /0)
ED-EMPTY
(d, e) (Π, ∆) c 6∈ ∆
(d ; c : l, e) (Π, ∆ ∪ c : l)
ED-CNST
(d, e) (Π, ∆) k 6∈ ∆
(d ; k : l, e) (Π, ∆ ∪ k : l)
ED-KEY
(d, e) (Π, ∆) a 6∈ ∆
(d ; a : l, e) (Π, ∆ ∪ a : l)
ED-LOC
(d, e) (Π, ∆) f 6∈ ∆
(d ; l f (−→x ) {e′}, e) (Π, ∆ ∪ f (−→x ) = e′ : l)
ED-FUNC
Figure 4.1: Construction rules for evaluation domains
levels associated with other values are either fixed, or are based on the security levels
of their sub-expressions. The function which maps a value to its associated security
level is given in Definition 4.5. The set of function definitions is also generated from
the API definition, and it remains fixed throughout the evaluation of an expression. The
set of confounders is initially empty, and is added to whenever an encryption operation
occurs. This set is used to ensure that each new confounder is fresh. The store contains
exactly those locations for which there are security level mappings in L.
For brevity, the following shorthand notations are used throughout this chapter,
where ∆ = (L,F,N, φ):
c 6∈ ∆ ≡ c 6∈ dom(L)
k 6∈ ∆ ≡ k 6∈ dom(L)
a 6∈ ∆ ≡ a 6∈ dom(L)
n 6∈ ∆ ≡ n 6∈ dom(N)
f 6∈ ∆ ≡ f 6∈ dom(F)
∆(a) ≡ φ(a)
∆ ∪ c : l ≡ ((L, c : l),F,N, φ)
∆ ∪ k : l ≡ ((L, k : l),F,N, φ)
∆ ∪ a : l ≡ ((L, a : l),F,N, φ)
∆ ∪ n ≡ (L,F, (N, n), φ)
∆ ∪ f (−→x ) = e′ : l ≡ (L, (F, f (−→x ) = e′ : l),N, φ)
∆[a 7→ v] ≡ (L,F,N, φ[a 7→ v])
Figure 4.1 presents the rules for generating an initial evaluation domain from a program
definition, while Fig. 4.2 shows a basic API definition and program expression, along
with the resulting initial evaluation context and initial evaluation environment.
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HIGH km // secret master key
HIGH KEY // location to store encryption key
HIGH k1 // arbitrary secret encryption key
LOW msg // arbitrary public message
// Updates the stored encryption key. The supplied cipher text is decrypted with the
// master key and, if successful, the result is stored as the encryption key. Returns
// TRUE on success and FALSE otherwise.
LOW
set key(wKey) {
try sdec(km, wKey) = k in
let x = (KEY := k) in TRUE
else FALSE
}





// Sets the encryption key to k1 and then encrypts msg.
let x = set key(ctxt(n1, km, k1)) in encrypt msg(msg)
Π = ε
L = km : HIGH, k1 : HIGH, msg : LOW, KEY : HIGH
F = set key(wKey) =
(try sdec(wKey, k) = km in (let x = (KEY := k) in TRUE) else FALSE) : LOW,
encrypt msg(msg) =
senc(*KEY, msg) : LOW
N = n1
φ = (KEY 7→ 0)
Figure 4.2: Simple API and program definition, with resulting initial evaluation context
and environment.
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Read and write operations on the store are defined as follows:
φ(a) ≡ v where (a 7→ v) ∈ φ Read
φ[a 7→ v] ≡ φ′ where dom(φ′) = dom(φ), (a 7→ v) ∈ φ′ and
∀a′ ∈ dom(φ′) ((a′ 6= a ∧ (a′ 7→ v′) ∈ φ)→ (a′ 7→ v′) ∈ φ′)
Write
We assume that locations are never read from before they have been assigned to for
the first time. Since we do not allow new locations to be created at execution time, this
can be guaranteed by initialising the store to contain default values for each location.
We define the function lvl∆(·) which maps values to security levels, in accordance with
a set of security level mappings, as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function).
The security level of a value, with respect to a set of security level mappings L from
some evaluation environment ∆, is given by the function lvl∆(·), corresponding to
the least relation defined inductively by the following rules:
lvl∆(c) = l iff c : l ∈ L
lvl∆(k) = l iff k : l ∈ L
lvl∆(a) = ⊥
⊥ if lvl∆(vm) ≤ lvl∆(vk)





The security level of a constant or key is taken from the evaluation environment, while
memory addresses and Boolean values are defined to be public. Boolean values are
public because the two possible values are common knowledge, however this does not
preclude the ability to have a confidential Boolean variable. Memory addresses are
public because knowledge of a memory address does not mean that the contents of the
corresponding location can be read. This distinction lets us use memory addresses as
key handles when modelling Cachin and Chandran’s API in Chapter 5. Ciphertext is
defined to be public when the security level of the key dominates that of the message,
as only those people with knowledge of the key are able to recover the message, thus
the ciphertext can be declassified. When the security level of the key is lower than
that of the message, the ciphertext cannot be declassified, since someone who is not
permitted to know the message may have the key and be able to decrypt the ciphertext.
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A store is said to be valid when the security level of the values stored in each location
are no greater than the maximum level which the API definition states may be stored
in that location:
Definition 4.6 (Valid Store).
A store φ is said to be valid with respect to some set of security level mappings L,
written L` φ , iff (a : l ∈ L)→ (a ∈ dom(φ) ∧ lvl∆(φ(a)) ≤ l).
Intuitively, a store is valid provided that when a user is permitted to read some memory
location, they are permitted to know the contents of that location.
We are now ready to present the evaluation rules for K, and these are shown in Fig. 4.3.
Informally, the evaluation rules have the following semantics:
E-VAL Has no effect. This rule exists to help simplify the definition of certain
Lemmas and Theorems by avoiding the need to distinguish between the
expression being a value or not.
E-VAR Returns the value that the variable is mapped to in the evaluation context.
E-LET Adds a new variable to the evaluation context, mapped to the value that
the first expression evaluates to. The second expression is then evaluated
against this updated context.
E-SENC This rule corresponds to a symmetric encryption operation. The key and
message expressions are evaluated, and then ciphertext is returned which
includes a fresh confounder. As noted in §3.1.1, the confounder is used
to model the probabilistic nature of the encryption cipher (i.e., different
encryption operations that use the same key and message will produce
ciphertexts with different confounders and thus they will be non-equal).
E-SDEC1 This rule corresponds to a successful decryption operation. The key and
ciphertext expressions are evaluated and the ciphertext has been encrypted
with the same key. The plaintext is assigned to the specified, new variable
with the result of evaluating the first branch expression under the extended
evaluation context is then returned.
E-SDEC2 This rule corresponds to an unsuccessful decryption operation. The key
and ciphertext expressions are evaluated and either the ciphertext has not
been encrypted with the same key, or it is not even ciphertext. The result
of evaluating the second branch expression is then returned.
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Π ` 〈∆, v〉 ⇓ 〈∆, v〉
E-VAL
(x 7→ v) ∈ Π
Π ` 〈∆, x〉 ⇓ 〈∆, v〉
E-VAR
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v1〉 x 6∈ dom(Π) Π∪(x 7→ v1) ` 〈∆′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v2〉
Π ` 〈∆, let x = e1 in e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v2〉
E-LET
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, k〉 Π ` 〈∆′, em〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉 n 6∈ ∆′′
Π ` 〈∆, senc(ek, em)〉 ⇓ 〈(∆′′∪ n), ctxt(n, k, v)〉
E-SENC
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, k〉 Π ` 〈∆′, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, ctxt(n, k, vm)〉
x 6∈ dom(Π) Π∪(x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆′′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v〉
E-SDEC1
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, k〉 Π ` 〈∆′, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, vc〉
vc 6= ctxt(n, k, vm) Π ` 〈∆′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v〉
E-SDEC2
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉 Π ` 〈∆′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, e1 == e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, TRUE〉
E-EQ1
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v1〉 Π ` 〈∆′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v2〉 v1 6= v2
Π ` 〈∆, e1 == e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, FALSE〉
E-EQ2
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, TRUE〉 Π ` 〈∆′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
E-IF1
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, FALSE〉 Π ` 〈∆′, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, if e1 then e2 else e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
E-IF2
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, a〉 Π ` 〈∆′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆, e1 := e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′[a 7→ v ], v〉
E-ASGN
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, a〉
Π ` 〈∆, *e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, ∆′(a)〉
E-DREF
∀i∈1..n Π ` 〈∆i−1, ei〉 ⇓ 〈∆i, vi〉 f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆n
x′i 6∈ dom(Π) x′i 6∈ FV(ef ) (Π∪ x′i 7→ vi) ` 〈∆n, [x′i /xi ]ef 〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉
Π ` 〈∆0, f (ei i∈1..n)〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉
E-FNAPP
Figure 4.3: Evaluation rules in K
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E-EQ1 This rule corresponds to a successful equality test. The two expressions
are evaluated and produce the same value, thus TRUE is returned.
E-EQ2 This rule corresponds to an unsuccessful equality test. The two expressions
are evaluated and produce different values, thus FALSE is returned.
E-IF1 The guard expression is evaluated and produces TRUE, and the result of
the evaluating the first branch expression is then returned.
E-IF2 The guard expression is evaluated and produces FALSE, and the result of
the evaluating the first branch expression is then returned.
E-ASGN Updates the value stored in the location that the expression evaluates to.
E-DREF Returns the value stored in the location that the expression evaluates to.
E-FNAPP This rule corresponds to calling a pre-defined function. If present, the
function arguments are evaluated, in left-to-right order, then the function
argument variables in the function body expression are replaced with fresh
variables (to avoid variable capture in case that the same function is called
multiple times). This modified function body expression is then evaluated
with respect to an extended evaluation context that includes the function
argument variable mappings.
Observe that none of the evaluation rules include security level checks. This ensures
that all of the security guarantees follow exclusively from the typing rules (see Figs. 4.4
and 4.5).
4.3 Security Properties
The two security properties which K is designed to enforce are confidentiality and non-
interference.
4.3.1 Confidentiality
Definition 4.7 (Confidentiality-Preserving Expression).
An expression e is confidentiality-preserving with respect to an evaluation domain
(Π, ∆) and security level l if whenever Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉, we have:
• lvl∆′(v) ≤ l
• (a : l′ ∈ ∆′∧ a 7→ v′ ∈ ∆′)→ lvl∆′(v′) ≤ l′
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This property states that, for some initial evaluation domain (Π, ∆) and observation
level l, an expression is confidentiality-preserving when, after evaluation, the security
level of the result is no greater than l and the security level of each value stored in
a location is no greater than that which the location may store. In other words, no
write-downs will occur as a result of evaluating the expression against the given initial
evaluation domain.
4.3.2 Non-Interference
The non-interference property is defined formally in terms of two related program
executions. Specifically, given an expression and two evaluations which differ only in
the non-observable part of their initial state, the adversary should be unable to detect
any differences between the results of the two evaluations. The result of an evaluation
is the value which the expression evaluates to, as well as the observable part of the
state at each step of the evaluation. We do not attempt to address differences such as
evaluation time. However, before we present our definition of non-interference, we
must first provide a few supporting definitions.
Indistinguishability of Values
Central to the non-interference property is the notion of what it means for two values to
be indistinguishable. Definition 4.8 presents the formal relation that we will use, and is
based on the informal relation described in Section 3.4.2. This definition is equivalent
to the original version given in [McCullough, 1988] and is a weakening of equality that
takes into account the information-hiding properties of probabilistic ciphers.
Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
With respect to some security level mapping L, two values, v and v′, are defined to
be indistinguishable at the observation level l, written L ` v≈l v′, if one or more of
the following conditions hold:
• v = v′
• v = ctxt(n, k, vm), v′ = ctxt(n′, k′, v′m), lvlL(k) 6≤ l and lvlL(k′) 6≤ l
• v = ctxt(n, k, vm), v′ = ctxt(n′, k′, v′m), k = k′ and L ` vm≈l v′m
To aid the understanding of this definition, we now present some examples of both
indistinguishable and distinguishable pairs of values, where the subscripts on constants
and keys denote the associated security level:
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1. L ` cH 6≈L c′H, where cH 6= c′H
When the indistinguishability relation is applied to two non-ciphertext values,
the security levels associated with those values are ignored. If cH and c′H were
deemed to be indistinguishable at the observation level L, the relation would still
hold when the observer could obtain two high security, but non-equal, values —
a direct information leak which we want the relation to be able to detect.
2. L ` ctxt(n, kH, cL)≈L ctxt(n′, kH, c′L), where cL 6= c′L
Since the key used to encrypt both cL and c′L is non-observable, we assume that
the adversary cannot decrypt either of the two ciphertexts himself. As such,
due to the properties we require of the cipher, the adversary cannot distinguish
between the two values. Note that the relation still holds if the two keys were
non-equal, provided that they are both still unknown to the adversary.
3. L ` ctxt(n, kL, cL) 6≈L ctxt(n′, k′L, cL), where kL 6= k′L
In this example, the security level associated with both encryption keys means
that the observer is permitted to obtain them. Consequently, we assume that the
observer does indeed know both keys and is therefore able to correctly decrypt
both ciphertexts. It then follows that, even though the plain texts are the same,
the observer can distinguish between the two ciphertexts because a different key
was required to correctly decrypt each one.
4. L ` ctxt(n, kL, cL) 6≈L ctxt(n′, kH, cL), where kL 6= kH
Here, the observer is only able to decrypt one of the two ciphertexts, and can
thus deduce that the ciphertexts were created using different keys.
5. L ` ctxt(n, kL, cH) 6≈L ctxt(n′, kL, c′H), where cH 6= c′H
The two confidential constants in this example have been insecurely encrypted
thus the observer can distinguish the two ciphertexts by first decrypting each one
before comparing the resulting messages which have been leaked. This example
is a further demonstration of the reason why the security levels associated with
non-ciphertext values must be ignored: if they were not, then the two ciphertexts
would incorrectly be deemed indistinguishable.
6. L ` ctxt(n1, kL, ctxt(n2, kH, cH))≈L ctxt(n3, kL, ctxt(n4, k′H, c′H)), where cH 6= c′H and
kH 6= k′H
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The observer can correctly decrypt both ciphertexts using the same key, resulting
in two further non-equal ciphertexts. However, because the observer is unable
to distinguish between the two secondary ciphertexts, and both were obtained
using the same decryption key, kL, he has no way of distinguishing between the
original ciphertexts.
Indistinguishability of Evaluation Domains
Definition 4.9 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments).
Two evaluation environments, ∆1 and ∆2, are defined to be indistinguishable at the
observation level l, written ∆1≈l ∆2, when all of the following rules hold:
• ∆1 ≡ (L,F,N1, φ1)
• ∆2 ≡ (L,F,N2, φ2)
• ∀a : l′∈ L (l′≤ l)→ L ` φ1(a)≈l φ2(a)
Informally, this relation states that the observable components of the two evaluation
environments are indistinguishable.
Definition 4.10 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts).
Two evaluation contexts, Π1 and Π2, are defined to be indistinguishable at the
observation level l, written ∆ `Π1≈l Π2, when both of the following hold:
• ∀x ∈ dom(Π1) ((x 7→ v) ∈Π1∧ (lvl∆(v) ≤ l))→∃v′.((x 7→ v′) ∈Π2∧ ∆ ` v≈l v′)
• ∀x ∈ dom(Π2) ((x 7→ v′) ∈Π2∧ (lvl∆(v′) ≤ l))→∃v.((x 7→ v) ∈Π1∧ ∆ ` v≈l v′)
Informally, this relation states that the observable parts of the two evaluation contexts
are indistinguishable. Consider the following examples:
1. ([(x 7→ cL)], ∆) 6≈L ([(x 7→ cL), (y 7→ c′L)], ∆)
The variable y, which maps to the observable value c′L, has no corresponding
variable in the other evaluation context.
2. ([(x 7→ cL)], ∆)≈L ([(x 7→ cL), (y 7→ cH)], ∆)
In this example, the variable y maps to the non-observable value cH, therefore the
two evaluation contexts have equal observable parts, and thus the two domains
are considered indistinguishable.
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3. ([(x 7→ vL), (y 7→ v′L)], ∆)≈L ([(x 7→ v′′L), (y 7→ v′′′L )], ∆) iff L ` vL≈L v′′L and L ` v′L≈L v′′′L
The domain of variables which map to observable values is the same in both
evaluation contexts, therefore the two evaluation domains are indistinguishable
if and only if each pair of values are indistinguishable.
Now that we have formally defined what it means for values, evaluation contexts and
evaluation states to be indistinguishable, we can now present the non-interference
property that we will use:
Definition 4.11 (Non-Interferent Expression).
An expression e is non-interferent at the security level l with respect to two ini-
tial evaluation domains (Π1, ∆1) and (Π2, ∆2) when it follows from ∆1≈l ∆2,




In this section, we present typing rules for the abstract system defined in §4.1, and
then prove that they enforce the security properties from §4.3. We begin by defining
the following types:
S ::= 〈E, l〉 Security Type
E ::= data | bool | l l key | enc(S) | S loc Data Types
F ::= {i : Si i∈1..n} l→S Function type
The subtyping rules, which define the type hierarchy, are presented in Fig. 4.4. The
security types are assigned to values as follows:
• 〈data, l〉
This type is assigned to any constant whose security level is no greater than l.
• 〈bool, l〉
This type is assigned to the Boolean values TRUE and FALSE, whose security
E <: E′ l ≤ l′







Figure 4.4: Subtyping rules in K
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level is no greater than l. When applied to the result of an equality test, l will be
no lower than the security level of each of the values being compared (see rule
T-EQ in Fig. 4.5).
• 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉
This type is assigned to cryptographic keys, where the l2 denotes the maximum
security level of data which the key is permitted to encrypt, and l1 specifies a
lower bound on the security level of any sub-expression of an encrypted message
(this corresponds to the minimum clearance level required to determine whether
or not a decryption operation with that key has failed).
• 〈enc(S), l〉
This type is assigned to a ciphertext containing an encrypted message of type S.
Since messages can only be encrypted by a key whose security level is no less
than that of the message, ciphertext may have any security level.
• 〈S loc, l〉
This type is associated with location identifiers for locations that may contain
values of type S. We consider location identifiers to be public since knowledge
of the identifier is not guaranteed to entail knowledge of the contents. As a result,
l may be any security level.
This type is similar to the τ var type for variables defined in [Volpano et al.,
1996]. In Volpano, Smith and Irvine’s type system, variables are read-only when
given the type τ, and write-only when given the type τ acc. In K, variables are
always read-only, and we can emulate read-only locations within an expression
by assigning the value stored in that location to a variable, then referencing the
variable instead (i.e., let x = *a in e). Write-only variables are used by Volpano,
Smith and Irvine to model function return values; in K, the return value of a
function is the value to which the function body evaluates. Multiple return values
can be achieved via passing in memory locations and assigning to them in the
body of the function, as is done in the programming language C, for example.
For values, these assignments are defined formally by Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the
Typing Relation for Values) and Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms). The former maps
from values to types, while the latter maps from types to values.
For any given security type, the security level denotes the confidentiality level of
the associated expression. Lemma 4.19 shows that this confidentiality level is no lower
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than the security level of the value that the expression evaluates to. Every expression
has a minimal type which is dominated by all other types that may be associated with
that term. This desirable property is not required to show any of the results in this
thesis, so we do not give a proof.
To ensure that our type system only permits encryptions that produce ciphertext which
may be declassified, it is necessary to place some restrictions upon the security levels in
the type for cryptographic keys. Specifically, the security level associated with the key
must be no lower than the security level associated with the messages it may encrypt.
Additionally, since the remaining security level denotes a lower bound on the security
levels contained within the message type, it must be no greater than the security level
of the message. Any type which does not break these restrictions is termed a valid
type, and the formal definition of this relation is as follows:
Definition 4.12 (Valid Security Types).
A security type is defined to be valid according to the following rules:
• 〈data, l〉 is valid
• 〈bool, l〉 is valid
• 〈S loc, l〉 is valid iff S is valid
• 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 is valid iff l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3
• 〈enc(S), l〉 is valid iff S is valid
The type for functions defines an upper bound on the security type of the input values,
and a lower bound on the security type of the result value. The security level on the
arrow denotes the minimum level to which information may flow as a result of that
function being executed. For example, a function which takes high inputs, returns a
high result, but modifies the contents of a memory location that can be read by anyone
will have a type of the form {i : 〈Ei, H〉 i∈1..n} L→〈E, H〉. This additional security level is
required to track memory side-effects arising from calling the associated function.
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Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type).
The minimum level of a security type S, denoted bSc, is defined according to the
following rules:
• b〈data, l〉c = l
• b〈bool, l〉c = l
• b〈S loc, l〉c = lfbSc
• b〈l1 l2 key, l3〉c = l1
• b〈enc(S), l〉c = lfbSc
This relation returns the greatest lower bound of all security levels which are present
in the type.
4.4.1 Typing Relation
Expressions are typed with respect to a typing environment Σ, typing context Γ and
minimum write level lw:
Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ Typing relation
The typing context comprises a set of variable to type mappings, while the typing
environment comprises types for constants, keys, locations and functions:
Γ ::= x : S, Γ | ε Typing context
Σ ::= c : S, Σ | k : S, Σ | a : S, Σ | f : F, Σ | ε Typing environment
(Γ, Σ) Typing domain
Definition 4.14 (Valid Typing Environment).
A typing environment Σ is defined to be valid when all of the security types present
within it are valid.
The minimum write is analogous to the program counter from Fenton’s Data Mark
Machine (as discussed in §2.2), and denotes the minimum confidentiality level of non-
ciphertext values which the expression may evaluate to or write into memory locations.
Lemma A.5 shows that, for all non-ciphertext values, lw is a lower-bound on the
security level in the associated type. This highlights our intention that the only way for
information to exist in a lower-security context is for it to be encrypted.
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4.4.2 Domain Consistency
The security properties that we wish to prove are upheld by well-typed programs are
defined independently of the type system. Consequently, to project the properties of a
typed program onto the untyped evaluation, we must define a relationship between the
typing and evaluation domains which formalises the notion that the typing domain is a
valid representation of the evaluation domain:
Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency).
A typing domain (Γ, Σ) and an evaluation domain (Π, ∆) are said to be consistent,
written (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), precisely when the following conditions hold:
• c : 〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ ↔ c : l ∈ ∆
• k : 〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ ↔ k : l ∈ ∆
• a : 〈〈E, l〉 loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ a : l ∈ ∆, (a 7→ v) ∈ ∆ and `⊥ v : 〈E, l〉
• x : S ∈ Γ ↔ (x 7→ v) ∈ Π and `⊥ v : S
• f : {i : Si i∈1..n} lw→S ∈ Σ ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = e ∈ ∆, xi 6∈ dom(Γ) and
(Γ, xi : Si) `lw e : S
For constants and keys, the security level in the corresponding type matches that given
in the evaluation environment. For locations, the security level associated with the type
of the content must match that given in the evaluation environment, and the value stored
in that location must have the specified type. The type associated with a variable in the
typing context must be valid for the value assigned to that variable in the evaluation
environment. Finally, the type for each function in the typing domain must be valid
with respect to the implementation given in the evaluation environment. Note that the
requirement for each parameter variable to not be in the typing context can be satisfied
easily via Convention 4.2 (Alpha Renaming).
Intuitively, this relation ensures that the security levels of the types in the typing
domain are no lower than those in the evaluation domain. In other words, the typing
domain cannot treat a value as being less secure than it actually is, but it may consider
it to be more secure.
4.4.3 Typed API Definition
In Section 4.1, we presented the abstract syntax for API definitions. Recall that this
definition maps constants, keys and locations to security levels, as well as defining the
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functions which comprise the API. We now give a typed variant of this abstract syntax
which maps constants, keys, locations and functions to security types:
d ::= d ; c : 〈data, l〉 | d ; k : 〈l l key, l〉 | d ; a : S |
d ; lw f (
−→
x :S) {e : S} | ε
API definition
Note that the type associated with a location defines the type of values which may
be stored in that location, not the type of the location itself — in K, the type of the
location will always be 〈S loc,⊥〉 since location identifiers are assumed to be public.
The security level lw associated with each API function defines the minimum write
level when executing the function body, e. The security type S denotes the return type
of the function. We obtain the untyped API definition from a given typed definition via
the following erasure function, [|·|]:
[|d ; c : 〈data, l〉|] = [|d|] ; c : l
[|d ; k : 〈l l key, l〉|] = [|d|] ; k : l
[|d ; a : 〈E, l〉|] = [|d|] ; a : l
[|d ; lw f (
−→
x :S) {e : S}|] = [|d|] ; f (−→x ) {e}
[|ε|] = ε
4.4.4 Typing Rules
The typing and subtyping rules in K are shown in Figs. 4.5 and 4.4, respectively. We
now discuss some of the more interesting type rules.
Primitive values are assigned a security type where the security level is no lower
than the minimum write level, lw. This reflects the fact that, when inside the branch of
a conditional expression, the value carries with it information about the result of the
associated guard expression.
In T-SDEC and T-IF, the minimum write level for the branch expressions are at
least as great as the security level of the guard expression. An alternative approach in
these two rules would have been to force the security level of the result to be at least as
high as the level of the guard expression. However, this would prevent us from being
able to return ciphertext with a lower security level in cases where that ciphertext will
not reveal anything about the guard expression. Specifically, this alternative approach
would not allow us to give the type 〈enc(〈data, H〉), L〉 to the following expression:
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c : 〈data, l〉 ∈ Σ
`lw c : 〈data, lglw〉
T-CNST
`l TRUE : 〈bool, l〉
T-TRUE
k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 ∈ Σ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3
`l1 k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉
T-KEY
`l FALSE : 〈bool, l〉
T-FALSE
a : 〈S loc, l〉 ∈ Σ lw ≤ bSc
`lw a : 〈S loc, lglw〉
T-LOC
lw ≤ b〈E, lglw〉c
x : 〈E, l〉 `lw x : 〈E, lglw〉
T-VAR
Γ `lw e1 : S′ x 6∈ dom(Γ) (Γ, x : S′) `lw e2 : S
Γ `lw let x = e1 in e2 : S
T-LET
`lw k : 〈l′ l key,>〉 `lw v : 〈E, l〉 l′ ≤ b〈E, l〉c
`lw ctxt(n, k, v) : 〈enc(〈E, l〉),⊥〉
T-CTXT
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ l key,>〉 Γ `lw em : 〈E, l〉 l′ ≤ b〈E, l〉c
Γ `lw senc(ek, em) : 〈enc(〈E, l〉),⊥〉
T-SENC
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉 Γ `lw ec : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉 l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
x 6∈ dom(Σ) (Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `l′glw e1 : S Γ `l′glw e2 : S
Γ `lw try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2 : S
T-SDEC
Γ `lw e1 : 〈E, l〉 Γ `lw e2 : 〈E, l〉 E 6≡ enc(S)
Γ `lw e1 == e2 : 〈bool, l〉
T-EQ
Γ `lw e1 : 〈bool, l〉 Γ `lglw e2 : S Γ `lglw e3 : S
Γ `lw if e1 then e2 else e3 : S
T-IF
Γ `lw e1 : 〈S loc,>〉 Γ `lw e2 : S
Γ `lw e1 := e2 : S
T-ASGN
Γ `lw e1 : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉 lw ≤ b〈E, lglw〉c
Γ `lw *e : 〈E, lglw〉
T-DREF
f : {i : Si i∈1..n} l
′
w→〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ lw ≤ l′w ∀i∈1..n Γ `lw ei : Si
Γ `lw f (ei i∈1..n) : 〈E, lglw〉
T-FNAPP
Γ′ `l′w e : S′ Γ′ ⊆ Γ lw ≤ l′w S′<: S
Γ `lw e : S
T-SUB
Figure 4.5: Typing rules for expressions in K w.r.t. some fixed typing environment Σ





v1 : 〈bool, H〉
v2 : 〈data, H〉
v3 : 〈data, H〉
k : 〈H H key, H〉
As can be seen in T-SENC (and T-CTXT), ciphertext is given the minimum security
level, ⊥, and T-IF does not increase this level based on lw.
In T-SDEC, the inequality condition ensures that information about the success or
otherwise of the decryption does not leak to a security level lower than l′. As shown
by Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation for Values), we have lw ≤ l′ therefore
the inequality also ensures that this information does not leak to a level lower than
the minimum write level. This is a critical requirement for our proof of Theorem 4.21
(Non-Interference for Typed Expressions) to go through. Similar inequalities exist in
other typing rules for this same reason.
The Bell-LaPadula *-security property (“no write down”) is enforced in T-LOC
by the inequality condition, while the rules do not directly enforce the simple security
property (“no read-up”). The reason for the latter behaviour is that the adversary is only
permitted to obtain the result of an evaluation and the contents of memory locations
which may only contain values with an associated security level that is no greater than
his own clearance level. In other words, for memory accesses, our model implicitly
enforces no read up, while for return values, we are only interested in expressions
which should return values that the adversary is permitted to read.
In T-EQ, the third condition is a consequence of Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability
of Values). This definition equates any two ciphertexts when the adversary is unable
to decrypt either one. However, since two such ciphertexts may be non-equal, testing
them for equality would subvert this weakening. An alternative approach would have
been to modify E-EQ1 to return TRUE when the two values are indistinguishable, but
that would detract from the intuitiveness of the evaluation semantics, so we decided
against that option.
4.5 Security Proofs
In this section we prove that the evaluation of a well-typed client program which calls
functions from a well-typed Security API is both confidentiality-preserving and non-
interferent. The former property is implied by the latter, but we give a proof that is
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independent of noninterference as it allows us to introduce many of the fundamental
lemmas at an earlier stage.
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we omit many of the actual proofs from this
chapter, providing only formal statements of the various supporting properties and
lemmas, along with selected proof cases for the main theorems. The full proofs, for all
properties, are given in Appendix A.
It should be noted that many proofs are only valid for terminating evaluations.
This is due to the proof case for function application in Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety)
requiring that all function definitions are sound with respect to that Theorem, and that
is only true for terminating function calls. This restriction is reasonable as we do not
consider side-channel attacks arising from non-termination in this thesis, since API
functions are generally intended to always terminate, regardless of the supplied inputs.
To help simplify the function application sub-case in Theorem 4.18, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 4.16. When the necessary preconditions exist, Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety)
holds for all function body expressions defined in Σ
This assumption does not restrict our result, as the termination requirement means
that all function applications could be unrolled and replaced with the corresponding
function body expression. Consequently, an equivalent program can be obtained that
does not include any function calls, rendering this assumption redundant.
4.5.1 Confidentiality
Our first result — that well-typed expressions are confidentiality-preserving as defined
by Definition 4.7 — is stated formally as follows:
Theorem 4.17 (Confidentiality Preservation).
If Γ `lw e : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ then, for any valid evaluation domain (Π, ∆) such that
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), e is confidentiality-preserving with respect to (Π, ∆) and l.
We prove this theorem via Type Safety — a standard theorem for type systems which
states that the result of an evaluation will have the same type as the initial expression
— and a lemma which provides an upper bound on the security level of a well-typed
value:
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Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety).
For any valid typing domain (Γ, Σ) and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), if Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ then either e is a value, or there exists some
final state 〈∆′, v〉 such that Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉, (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′) and `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ.
Lemma 4.19 (Upper Bound on the Security Level of Well-Typed Values).
For any valid typing domain (Γ, Σ) and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), it follows from `lw v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ that lvl∆(v) ≤ l.
The proofs for Theorem 4.18 and Lemma 4.19 are both relatively straightforward,
although they are dependent upon Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency) — this is
why the Type Safety Theorem also requires that this relationship is maintained.
Given these two properties, the proof of Theorem 4.17 (Confidentiality Preserva-
tion) is reasonably straightforward:
Proof.
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety), either e is a value or we have (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
and `lw v : 〈E, l〉. In the former case, we have v = e and ∆′ = ∆. We already have
Γ `lw v : 〈E, l〉 and since values do not contain variables, we get `lw v : 〈E, l〉.
Consequently, in both cases, we get lvl∆(v) ≤ l via Lemma 4.19 (Upper Bound on
the Security Level of Well-Typed Values).
We also have (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′) in both cases, therefore it follows from Definition 4.15
(Domain Consistency) that, for all a : l′ ∈ ∆′, we have `⊥ v′ : 〈E′, l′〉 where a 7→ v′∈ ∆′
and a : 〈〈E′, l′〉 loc, l′′〉 ∈ Σ. It therefore follows from Lemma 4.19 (Upper Bound on
the Security Level of Well-Typed Values) that for each v′ we have lvl∆′(v′) ≤ l′.
4.5.2 Non-Interference
Our second result — that well-typed expressions are non-interferent — is stated for-
mally as follows:
Theorem 4.20 (Non-Interferent Expression).
If Γ `lw e : 〈E, l〉w.r.t. Σ then, for any two evaluation domains (Π1, ∆1) and (Π2, ∆2)
such that (Γ, Σ)' (Π1, ∆1), (Γ, Σ)' (Π2, ∆2), Γ `Π1≈lo Π2 and Σ `∆1≈lo ∆2
where l ≤ lo ≤ lw, e is non-interferent at security level lo with respect to (Π1, ∆1)
and (Π2, ∆2).
From a security perspective, we are interested in cases where lo is the observation level
of the adversary, and the adversary is permitted to obtain the result of the evaluation,
Chapter 4. Formal System 67
thus we will have l ≤ lo. Since lw denotes the maximum level to which no downward
information flows are permitted by the type system, it follows that the expression can
only be non-interferent when lw ≥ lo. Typically, l and lo will be ⊥, in which case lw
can be any level.
We prove this theorem by first showing that well-typed expressions uphold a typed
version of indistinguishability (see Definition A.6), then subsequently show that, given
the preconditions of our second result, this typed version of indistinguishability implies
the untyped version which we require.
Theorem 4.21 (Non-Interference for Typed Expressions).
If Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ, Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉 and Π′ ` 〈∆′, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉, where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), (Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′), Σ is valid, Γ `Π≈lo Π′, Σ `∆≈lo ∆′ and lo ≤ lw,
then v≈lo v′ : S and Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r.
Lemma 4.22 (Indistinguishability).
If `lw v1 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ, `lw v2 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ and v1≈lo v2 : 〈E, l〉 then, for any
typing context Γ and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), it follows
from lo ≥ l that ∆ ` v1≈lo v2.
Lemma 4.23 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments).
If Σ `∆1≈l ∆2, (Γ, Σ)' (Π1, ∆1) and (Γ, Σ)' (Π2, ∆2) then ∆1≈l ∆2.
Theorem 4.21 is the critical result which proves that our type system enforces non-
interference. The proof itself relies upon a key Lemma, and this is discussed further
in the next section, where we present the case for the decryption rule (the proof itself
proceeds via structural induction on the form of the typing derivation).
Given the three properties from above, the proof of Theorem 4.20 (Non-Interferent
Expression) proceeds as follows:
Proof.
For any two evaluations of the form Π1 ` 〈∆1, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, v1〉 and Π2 ` 〈∆2, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′2, v2〉,
it follows from Theorem 4.21 (Non-Interference for Typed Expressions) that v1≈l v2 : 〈E, l〉
and Σ `∆′1≈l ∆′2. From Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety), we get `lw v1 : 〈E, l〉, `lw v2 : 〈E, l〉,
(Γ, Σ)' (Π1, ∆′1) and (Γ, Σ)' (Π2, ∆′2). The first part of our result, L∆′1 ` v1≈lo v2, fol-
lows via Lemma 4.22 (Indistinguishability), while the second part, ∆′1≈lo ∆′2 follows
via Lemma 4.23 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments).
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4.5.3 Proving Non-Interference for Typed Expressions
The full proof of Theorem 4.21 (Non-Interference for Typed Expressions) is given in
§A.2.3, and proceeds via structural induction on the form of the typing derivation.
For those type rules which do not correspond to expressions that can affect program
control-flow, the associated proof cases generally follow from the relevant definitions
and Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety). The remaining two cases, for decryption (T-SDEC)
and conditional branching (T-IF), both rely on the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values).
If `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ, `lw v′ : S w.r.t. Σ, Σ is valid and l < lw then v≈l v′ : S.
This Lemma states that, for any two values which can both be given the same type at
the same minimum write level, those values will be indistinguishable at that type for
all observation levels less than the minimum write level.
Corollary 4.25. If `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ, `lw v′ : S w.r.t. Σ, Σ is valid and v 6≈l v′ : S then
l 6< lw.
In other words, the minimum write level denotes a lower-bound on the clearance level
required to obtain information about any two values with the same type via well-typed
expressions. In conjunction with the restrictions that are placed upon the minimum
write level of branch expressions (via T-SDEC and T-IF), Lemma 4.24 shows that the
values returned by each branch are indistinguishable when the observer is unable to
see the outcome of the guard expression.
We will now show how this result is used in the proof case for decryption, which
is the most complex case in the entire proof of Theorem 4.21. First, we identify what
must hold when each evaluation has to choose which branch to take, then analyse each
of the two sub-cases corresponding to the same or different branch being chosen.
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By inspection of rule T-SDEC, we have:
e = try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Γ `lw ec : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `l′glw e1 : S
Γ `l′glw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 could have been
used at the root of each evaluation. In both cases, the key and ciphertext expressions
are evaluated in that order, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, k〉
Π ` 〈∆1, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, vc〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, k′〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆′2, v′c〉
By multiple applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆2)
`lw vc : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′2)
`lw v′c : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
By two applications of the induction hypothesis, we get:
k≈lo k′ : 〈l′ lm key, l〉
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
vc≈lo v′c : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l〉
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆′2
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
vc = ctxt(n, k1, vm)
v′c = ctxt(n
′, k2, v′m)
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values):
k = k′ or lo < l′
k1 = k2 or lo < l′
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We now split on the relative ordering of lo and l′:
• Subcase lo < l′:
By the properties of g:
lo < (l′glw)
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw k : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
In this subcase, each evaluation may have E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 at its root,
giving us:
v ∈ {v1, v2}
v′ ∈ {v′1, v′2}
where
Π∪ (x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v1〉
Π ` 〈∆2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v2〉
Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m) ` 〈∆′2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v2〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′2〉
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ vm), ∆2)
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m), ∆′2)
By two applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`l′glw v : S
`l′glw v′ : S
By Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
By two separate applications of Lemma A.12 (Preservation Under Evaluation of
Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆r
Σ `∆′2≈lo ∆′r
By two applications of Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability
for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
Chapter 4. Formal System 71
• Subcase lo 6< l′:




⇒ k = k1 iff k′ = k2
As a result, both evaluations must have the same rule at their root, giving us:
Π∪ (x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m) ` 〈∆′2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
or
Π ` 〈∆2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
By Definition A.8 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts):
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `Π∪ (x 7→ vm)≈lo Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m)
Consequently, for each of the two possible outcomes, the result follows from the
induction hypothesis.
4.6 Ill-Typed Expressions
As noted at the beginning of Chapter 3, our type system may not prevent attacks that
arise from the adversary program being ill-typed. Examples of such attacks are given
in Fig. 4.6.
In the first attack, the adversary has access to the secret value, while in the second,
he reads the memory location where it is stored. In the third attack, the API function
encrypt secret 1 expects to be given a secret key, but the adversary passes in a known
key, while in the fourth attack, the API function encrypt secret 2 expects to be given
a location that stores a secret key, but the adversary passes in a location that stores
a known key. In the final two cases, the adversary is able to decrypt the returned
ciphertext and obtain the secret value. However, these types of attack should never
arise in practice, for the following reasons:
• We assume that the adversary does not begin with knowledge of any secret terms,
and therefore cannot directly use any of them in the programs he may run. This
rules out the first attack.
• We assume that the adversary cannot directly obtain the contents of memory
locations which may store secret values. For security APIs provided by Hard-
ware Security Modules, such locations exist within the tamper-proof enclosure,
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secret : 〈data,>〉 // secret value
// Encrypts the secret value with the given (hopefully secret!) key
〈enc(〈data,>〉),⊥〉
encrypt secret 1(key : 〈⊥> key,>〉) {
senc(key, secret)
}
// Encrypts the secret value with the (hopefully secret!) key stored in the given
// location
〈enc(〈data,>〉),⊥〉
encrypt secret 2(hKey : 〈〈⊥> key,>〉 loc,⊥〉) {
senc(*hKey, secret)
}
// Adversary programs, which evaluate to secret
L = {key :⊥, a1 :⊥, a2 :>}
φ = {a1 7→ key, a2 7→ secret}
e1 = secret
e2 = *a2
e3 = try sdec(key, encrypt secret(key)) = x in x else FALSE
e4 = try sdec(key, encrypt secret(a1)) = x in x else FALSE
Figure 4.6: Type-confusion attacks on a well-typed API.
while for software-based security APIs, access to such locations are restricted at
compile-time or by the operating system. This rules out the second attack.
• API functions should accept as inputs only those types for values which the
intended callers are expected to know. For example, API functions which any
user may call should accept only public inputs, while API calls that security
officers may call could accept higher security inputs. This rules out the third
attack as encrypt secret 1 expects a secret key.
• API functions which accept locations that are expected to contain secret values
should verify that the provided location does indeed refer to such a location. In
practice, a security API will know which memory locations may be accessed by
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the caller, and which may not (e.g., based on memory address ranges). This rules
out the fourth attack as encrypt secret 2 would reject the supplied location.
We could have enforced these restrictions in our evaluation rules, but it would have
complicated the proofs and would not have prevented the adversary from providing
ill-typed inputs to API calls (e.g., using arbitrary data where ciphertext or a key is
expected). Providing security guarantees in the presence of ill-typed adversary code is
left as future work.
For now, our type system can be used to ensure that an API is secure when used
as intended, or when client code can be type-checked in advance (e.g., software-based
security APIs). For example, PKCS #11 has been shown to leak sensitive data when
certain sequences of well-typed API calls are made [Clulow, 2003b], [Tsalapati, 2007],
[Delaune et al., 2008], [Centenaro et al., 2012].
In the next chapter, we show how our type system can be used to provide security
guarantees for a restricted implementation of PKCS #11 that disallows these insecure
sequences of API calls.
Chapter 5
Example API Model
In this chapter, we demonstrate how our system can be used to model the cryptographic
API described in [Cachin and Chandran, 2009]. We have chosen this particular API
because it covers core functionality from real-world security APIs, and the authors
prove that it enforces specific security policies.
In presenting this model, we show that the enforcement of these security policies
follow automatically as a consequence of the model being well-typed in our system.
This serves to highlight the utility of our type system as a tool for enforcing practical
security policies in real-world APIs without the need for custom proofs.
5.1 API Overview
In [Cachin and Chandran, 2009], the authors present a formal model of a multi-user
security API with an explicitly defined security policy, comprising common functions
such as encryption and decryption, key wrapping and unwrapping, and cryptographic
signing and verification of data. In this API, each key has an Access Control List
(ACL) defining which operations each user may use that key for, along with additional
usage restrictions that are required in order for the security properties to be upheld.
These ACLs, along with a record containing information about what operations each
key has previously been used for, provide the basis for various checks that each API
function must carry out in order for that function to execute successfully.
The API is shown to be capable of representing a subset of PKCS #11 v2.20 [PKCS
#11] which covers encryption and decryption, signing and verification, and various
functions related to key management. Moreover, the authors prove that the standard
PKCS #11 security policies are enforced by this subset.
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5.1.1 Restrictions
The system presented in this thesis is not capable of modelling the entirety of Cachin
and Chandran’s API as it does not cater for public/private key pairs nor cryptographic
signing and verification. Additionally, as our system enforces security through static
typing, we cannot model the creation and/or deletion of users or keys nor the explicit
modification of ACLs. We therefore must make the following restrictions:
1. All keys are for use with symmetric encryption algorithms
2. The set of keys is fixed
3. The set of users is fixed
4. The ACL associated with each key is fixed
5. The ACL associated with each key only includes the read privilege
These restrictions do not preclude our ability to enforce the same security properties
as Cachin and Chandran, and all but the latter are enforced by many APIs for regular
(non-administrator) users. We only consider the read privilege explicitly, as the other
privileges are either modelled via types (see §5.2.1), or apply to key usages which we
cannot model (e.g., key derivation). Our model will comprise the following functions:
read, encrypt, decrypt, wrap and unwrap.
A final difference between our model and that of Cachin and Chandran is that they
lazily enforce usage restrictions on a key. That is, a key may be used the first time for
any cryptographic operation permitted by its ACL, but subsequent usages depend upon
what it was previously used for. For example, a key used to wrap another key cannot
subsequently be used to decrypt public data. In our system however, as a consequence
of using static typing, the permitted usages of a key must be specified in advance (via
the type assigned to it).
One outcome of the model we present in this chapter is that the type of a key in
our system is sufficient to satisfy the rules specified by Cachin and Chandran, so we
remove the need to carry out runtime checking of a key’s previous uses.
5.1.2 Key Attributes
In Cachin and Chandran’s API, each cryptographic key has an associated collection
of attributes and an ACL which defines what operations each user may use that key
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with. For each key, the API also keeps track of its dependents and readers. A key k1
is dependent upon another key k2 if k1 = k2, or k2 has been used to wrap k1, or there
exists a third key k3 such that k1 is dependent upon k3 and k3 is dependent upon k2. The
readers of a key k1 are those users who have used read(k) to obtain the cryptographic
value of any key upon which k1 is dependent. Due to the restrictions outlined above,
our model only has to consider the unextractable attribute along with the readers of
each key.
5.1.3 Security Policy
Cachin and Chandran specify the following security properties that their cryptographic
API upholds:
1. A user may only obtain the cryptographic value of a key whose ACL permits
that user to read the key.
“[T]he adversary may never add the read privilege to the ACL of any key ... with-
out this privilege, in particular, the key cannot become known to the adversary”
(p. 16, ¶ 1 )
2. A user must not be able to distinguish between two pieces of ciphertext (either
directly or via API calls) when that user is not permitted to obtain the plaintexts
within.
“The adversary may try to break the security of the token ... by distinguishing
legitimate encryptions from encryptions of a dummy message” (p. 16, ¶ 2 )
3. An unextractable key must remain inside the cryptographic device and therefore
cannot be read or wrapped.
“Keys with the unextractable attribute must remain on the token forever, and
cannot be read or wrapped” (p. 13, ¶ 6 )
4. An unextractable key cannot have its ACL modified.
“Keys with the unextractable attribute ... its ACL can no longer be modified”
(p. 13, ¶ 6 )
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5.2 API Model
We now describe our model of Cachin and Chandran’s cryptographic API along with
the various design decisions that were made.
5.2.1 Security Types
Cachin and Chandran enforce their security policy by way of key attributes, ACLs
and a key usage record, and it is our aim to show that the same security policy can
be enforced through our type system alone. To this end, we construct a security level
lattice that represents key attributes and ACLs, and show that our type system makes
redundant the key usage record when used with this lattice. We begin by observing
some properties that the types of keys in our model must possess:
1. Our type system requires that the security level of a key is at least as great as the
security level of any value it encrypts. As a result, the security level associated
with any key-wrapping key must be greater than the security level associated
with any data-encrypting key.
2. Cachin and Chandran’s API allows a key to be used to wrap another key or to
encrypt messages, but not both. It is therefore necessary that the type of any
key-encrypting key and the type of any data-encrypting key are incomparable.
However, our type system requires that the security level of a key-encrypting key
must dominate the security level of the key it encrypts, therefore this property
cannot be enforced in the types if we want to allow for the wrapping of data-
encryption keys. Consequently, this property will have to be enforced via the
API function signatures.
3. An unextractable key cannot be wrapped by a key-encrypting key. Consequently,
the security level associated with an unextractable key must be greater than the
security level associated with any key-encrypting key.
4. An unextractable key cannot be read by any user. Consequently, the security
level associated with an unextractable key must be greater than the security level
associated with any key that has the ‘read’ privilege for some user.
5. Our type system allows for the arbitrary increase of the security level associated
with a value. With regards to the ACL of a key, this means that a higher security
level must represent a more restrictive ACL.
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We can obtain these properties by using the following security level lattice:
l ::= (X , T , R ) security level
X ::= x | x extractable/unextractable
T ::= d | k data/key
R ⊆ U readers
X ≤ X ′ R ′ ⊆ R






It therefore follows that:
> = (x, k, /0)
⊥ = (x, d, U)
lu = (x, k,{u}) Clearance level of logged-in user u
Given this security level lattice, we assign types to keys and arbitrary data as follows,:
Arbitrary Data : 〈data, (x, d, R )〉
Data-Encrypting Keys : 〈l (x, d, R ′) key, (X , k, R )〉
Key-Encrypting Keys : 〈l (x, k, R ′) key, (X , k, R )〉
}
where (X = x)→ (R = /0)
Key Handles : 〈〈l l′ key, l′′〉 loc, (x, d, R )〉
In all cases, R denotes those users who are permitted to know the corresponding value,
and R ′ ⊆ R . The key types encode combinations of attributes that are permitted by
Cachin and Chandran’s setattr function.
5.2.2 Function Definitions
We now present implementations of the five API functions that our model comprises:1
read(k)
l
〈l l′ key, (x, k,{u})〉
read(hKey : 〈〈l l′ key, (x, k, R )〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉) {
*hKey
}
1In each implementation, the first line defines the minimum write-level and the second line defines
the return type. Where present, instances of u correspond to the user that is calling the function.
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In order for the read operation to execute successfully when the specified key handle
is associated with a symmetric key, Cachin and Chandran require that the user which
calls this function must be permitted to obtain the cryptographic value of any and all
dependents of that key. For this function to be well-typed, we must have u ∈ R . Since
our type system forces l′ to be dominated by (x, k, R ), it follows that l′ is of the form
(x, T , R ′) where R ⊆ R ′. Consequently, when the specified key is a key-encrypting
key (i.e., T = k), all dependents must have a security level of the form (x, T , R ′′) where
u ∈ R ′′, thus the check will pass.
Cachin and Chandran do not explicitly state that the key whose value is to be read
must be extractable, but their setattr function requires that unextractable keys have an
ACL where no users are permitted to read the cryptographic value. As expected, it





encrypt(hKey : 〈〈l (x, d, R ) key, (X , k, R ′)〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉, msg : 〈E, l′〉) {
senc(*hKey, msg)
}
Cachin and Chandran specify three checks that must pass for the encrypt operation to
execute successfully:
1. The type of the encryption key is symmetric or public. Since our model only
considers symmetric keys, this check will pass.
2. The encryption key has an ACL which permits the calling user to use that key
with the encrypt operation. In our model, this restriction is enforced by the
second parameter in the key type tuple.
3. The encryption key has only ever been used in the encrypt or decrypt operations.
The security level of the operand for the unwrapping key is specified as (x, d, R )
therefore it follows from the forms of types for keys in this model that only
data-encrypting keys can be given this type. As a result, this check will pass.




decrypt(hKey : 〈〈l (x, d, R ) key, (X , k, R ′)〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉,
ctxt : 〈enc(〈E, l′〉), (x, d,{u})〉,
pRes : 〈〈E, l′′〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉) {
try msg = sdec(*hKey, ctxt) in




Cachin and Chandran specify three checks that must pass for the decrypt operation to
execute successfully:
1. The type of the decryption key is symmetric or private. Since our model only
considers symmetric keys, this check will pass.
2. The decryption key has an ACL which permits the calling user to use that key
with the decrypt operation. In our model, this restriction is enforced by the
second parameter in the key type tuple.
3. The decryption key has only ever been used in the encrypt or decrypt operations.
The security level of the operand for the unwrapping key is specified as (x, d, R )
therefore it follows from the forms of types for keys in this model that only
data-encrypting keys can be given this type. As a result, this check will pass.
wrap(k1,k2)
l
〈enc(〈l′1 l′2 key, (x, k, R ′′)〉),⊥〉
wrap(hKey1 : 〈〈l1 (x, k, R ′) key, (x, k, R )〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉,
hKey2 : 〈〈l′1 l′2 key, (x, k, R ′′)〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉) {
senc(*hKey1, *hKey2)
}
Cachin and Chandran specify seven checks that must pass for the wrap operation to
execute successfully:
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1. The type of the wrapping key is symmetric. As noted earlier, our model only
considers symmetric keys, therefore this check will pass.
2. The wrapping key has an ACL which permits the calling user to use that key
with the wrap operation. In our model, this restriction is enforced by the second
parameter in the key type tuple.
3. Every user who has obtained the cryptographic value of the wrapping key is
permitted to obtain the cryptographic value of every key which is dependent
upon the key being wrapped. Our system requires that l3 dominate l2, and by the
security lattice definition, a dominating security level comprises a subset of the
readers in the dominated level. Thus, even when all users who are permitted to
obtain the cryptographic value of the key do so, this check will pass.
4. The wrapping key is not a dependent of the key being wrapped. This check is
used to prevent cycles in chains of key wrappings, thereby allowing for the use of
encryption schemes that may be insecure in the presence of cyclic chains. This
property is not dealt with by our type system, requiring either explicit checks (as
Cachin and Chandran do) or the use of an encryption scheme that remains secure
when key encryption cycles exist.2 For the purposes of this analysis, we assume
the latter, therefore this check is redundant.
5. The key being wrapped is extractable. The type of the result requires that the
security level of the wrapped key is dominated by (x, R ) and this can only occur
for extractable keys.
6. The key being wrapped is not the public half of a public-private key pair. As we
only consider symmetric keys in this model, this check will pass.
7. The wrapping key has only ever been used in the wrap or unwrap operations.
The security level of the operand for the wrapping key is specified as (x, k, R ′)
therefore it follows from the forms of types for keys in this model that only
key-encrypting keys can be given this type. As a result, this check will pass.
Since all relevant checks will pass, our type system provides a similar guarantee as
Cachin and Chandran for the security of well-typed programs which make use of this
API function.
2It is possible to modify our type system to require the security level of keys to be greater than the
security level of the data on which they operate without affecting the security result.




unwrap(hKey : 〈〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉,
wKey : 〈enc(〈l′1 l′2 key, (x, k, /0)〉), (x, d,{u})〉,
pRes : 〈〈l′1 l′2 key, (x, k, R )〉 loc, (x, d,{u})〉) {
try key = sdec(*hKey, wKey) in
if (*pRes == key) then
TRUE
else
if (*pRes == 0) then






Cachin and Chandran specify four checks that must pass before the unwrap operation
will attempt to import the encrypted key:
1. The type of the wrapping key is symmetric. As noted earlier, our model only
considers symmetric keys, therefore this check will pass.
2. The wrapping key has an ACL which permits the calling user to use that key
with the unwrap operation. In our model, this restriction is enforced by the
second parameter in the key type tuple.
3. No user will have been able to obtain the cryptographic value of the wrapping
key, to prevent the importing of known keys. This restriction is enforced in our
type system by requiring the set of readers for the unwrapping key to be empty,
therefore this check will pass.
4. The unwrapping key has only ever been used in the wrap or unwrap operations.
The security level of the operand for the unwrapping key is specified as (x, k, R )
therefore it follows from the forms of types for keys in this model that only
key-encrypting keys can be given this type. As a result, this check will pass.
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When importing a symmetric key, Cachin and Chandran require that all users which are
permitted to obtain the cryptographic value of the imported key are also permitted to
obtain the cryptographic value of any dependent keys. This follows via our type system
as a direct consequence of the security level of keys dominating the security level of
their operands — every value that a key encrypts is guaranteed to be readable by those
users who can read the encrypting key. Additionally, if a key is already associated with
the specified key handle then that key must equal the key being imported.
Finally, the imported key must be extractable, since it has come from outside of the
API boundary. This requirement is enforced via our type system by requiring that the
type of the imported key is dominated by (x, k, R ).
There are two minor differences between the above implementation of the unwrap
function and the description given by Cachin and Chandran:
1. The above implementation allows the caller to specify the key handle for the
imported key, rather than it being freely chosen by the device. This is due to
our system not having support for runtime generation of location references, and
does not affect the security result we are trying to show.
2. Cachin and Chandran cryptographically associate the attributes of a key with
that key’s wrapped form, to ensure that they cannot be tampered with during a
wrap/unwrap sequence.
5.3 Security Guarantees
In Chapter 4, we proved via Theorem 4.20 that well-typed programs are non-interferent.
It follows from this result that any well-typed user program which utilises the above
API function implementations cannot learn anything about data items which have a
higher security level than that of the user themselves. Based on this observation, we
now show that the security properties required by Cachin and Chandran follow from
those enforced by our type system:
1. A user may only obtain the cryptographic value of a key whose ACL permits that
user to read the key.
By inspection of the type signature for the read function, the key whose value is
to be read must have a type that is dominated by (x, k,{u}) — the security level
associated with user u. It therefore follows from the subtyping rules and the
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lattice ordering rules that all keys which meet this requirement have a type which
permits user u to obtain the key’s value. Consequently, no user can directly read
the value of a key whose ACL does not permit that user to do so.
Additionally, it is necessary to prevent a user from obtaining the value of any
key which can encrypt a key that that user is not permitted to obtain. Here, our
type system requires that the security level of such a key must dominate that of
the key being encrypted. Consequently, if the user is not permitted to obtain the
cryptographic value of the key being encrypted, the wrapping key will have a
type that prevents them from reading its value.
2. A user must not be able to distinguish between two pieces of ciphertext (either
directly or via API calls) when that user is not permitted to obtain the plaintexts
within.
This follows directly from the non-interference property that our type system
guarantees is possessed by well-typed programs.
3. An unextractable key must remain inside the cryptographic device and therefore
cannot be read or wrapped.
By inspection of the type signature for the read function, the key whose value
is to be read must have a type that is dominated by (x, k,{u}). Similarly, for
the wrap function, the key whose value is to be encrypted must have a type that
is dominated by (x, k,R ). It follows from the subtyping rules and the lattice
definition that no unextractable key will meet these requirements. Also, the type
signature for the encrypt function prevents it from being used to encrypt keys.
4. An unextractable key cannot have its ACL modified.
In our model, no key may have its ACL modified, therefore this property is
guaranteed to be upheld. However, if this restriction was to be relaxed, we could
still provide this guarantee as follows:
• Require that the type of any key whose ACL is to be modified has a security
level which is dominated by (x, k,{u}), so that any program which passes
in an unextractable key will be ill-typed.
• The ACL of a key may only be modified such that the corresponding type
dominates the original type. This endures that any security properties
which held before the ACL was changed still apply afterwards.
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5.4 Discussion
Since all of the functions are guaranteed to succeed when programs that call them
are well-typed, any well-typed program which calls these API functions is guaranteed
to uphold the security properties proven for our system in the previous chapter. In
reality though, security API attacks often work by calling functions with values that
have different types or forms to that which the function expects. In those scenarios,
it is necessary for the API to verify that each function input is indeed of the expected
type — and many of the checks which Cachin and Chandran describe are exactly
that. However, inputs like ciphertext cannot easily be checked in this way unless the
plaintext should comprise some known structure.
The evaluation semantics defined for our type system relies on decryption failure
being detectable — implying that the plaintext always has some known structure. In
the API commands that we modelled in this chapter, ciphertext parameters are either
decrypted with a key that only operates on public data (in the case of the decrypt
function), or correspond to wrapped keys (as in the case of the unwrap function). In
the former case, our type system ensures that keys which operate on public data can
only ever encrypt public data. As such, the only way that meaningful plaintext will
be returned is when the ciphertext is indeed public data encrypted with the specified
key. In the latter case, the API is free to determine the form of the plaintext in the
wrapped key, such that any decryption failure could be detected. Assuming that the
API does indeed do this, the model which we have presented in this chapter shows
that the checks enforced by Cachin and Chandran are sufficient to provide the security
guarantees afforded by our type system, without having to do any analysis or proofs
other than what we have shown in this chapter.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
We began by asking how to guarantee that a security API implementation does not
allow sensitive information to be obtained through some unbounded sequence of API
function calls. To answer this question, we developed a type system for a simple
imperative language with cryptographic primitives, such that any well-typed API was
guaranteed to be both confidentiality-preserving and non-interferent, provided that the
use of the API functions is also well-typed.
When analysing security APIs, the adversary has capabilities that are not present
in related areas such as security protocols, such as the ability to execute encryption
and decryption operations using unknown keys. This particular difference affects non-
interference, since it may allow the adversary to distinguish ciphertexts that he cannot
decrypt himself.
Our typing rules are independent of the security lattice, allowing for a more faithful
representation of the API implementation being modelled. This flexibility also enables
usage restrictions to be encoded in the security lattice, as was done in Chapter 5 with
our model of Cachin and Chandran’s API.
As is typical for type-based static analysis, the computational complexity of using
our type system to obtain these security guarantees scales linearly with the size of
the API model. Contrast this to the exponential time and/or memory requirements of
solutions which track the current knowledge of the adversary (e.g., [Keighren, 2006],
[Cortier et al., 2007]).
Given the ubiquity of security APIs in the modern world, and the responsibilities
placed upon them, it is critical that their design and implementation is backed by the
appropriate formal verification tools. We believe such tools must necessarily employ
API-agnostic static analysis techniques such as those presented in this thesis.
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6.1 Challenges
We faced a number of challenges during the course of our research:
• The ability of the adversary to execute decryptions without necessarily having
knowledge of the key or ciphertext meant that our notion of indistinguishability
had to ‘look inside’ ciphertext even when it was produced with a confidential key.
Ensuring that our definitions were both intuitive and accurate took considerable
effort. Another effect of the adversary having this capability was that our typing
rules had to be more restrictive, while still allowing us to define well-typed APIs
that were practical.
• Our security properties were defined with respect to the untyped system, so that
they were independent of the typing rules which would enforce them. As a result,
even though we were dealing with well-typed expressions, it was still necessary
to bridge the gap between the typed and untyped worlds. This was especially
problematic for our main non-interference result because the untyped indistin-
guishability relation assumed that the values being compared were known to the
adversary. This was not true when the values had a type whose security level
was greater than that of the adversary. In the end, we had to define a more strict,
typed version of non-interference and show that, under those circumstances of
interest, the original untyped version also held.
• The proof of Theorem 4.21 (Non-Interference for Typed Expressions) was the
most difficult to complete. Once again, it was decryption that was causing us
trouble. We wanted to make sure that decryption was not overly restricted, and
this meant determining whether or not the plaintext enabled any information to
legitimately become known by the adversary. For example, if the plaintext was a
key capable of decrypting ciphertext comprising public data, then regardless of
whether or not the adversary could obtain that key himself, he could discover if
the original decryption was successful or not. A resolution to the proof case for
decryption only arose after we identified and proved Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indis-
tinguishability of Arbitrary Values). This lemma showed when the outcome of a
branching operation (such as decryption) would be hidden from the adversary.
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6.2 Future Work
During the course of our research, we have identified a number of opportunities for
future work, mainly with respect to further development of the type system.
The most obvious area where the type system could be improved is in the range of
operations that are present. For example, adding support of public-key ciphers would
increase the number of APIs which could be represented. Type systems for public
key cryptography and authentication already exist in the field of security protocols
(e.g., [Abadi and Blanchet, 2001], [Gordon and Jeffrey, 2003]).
Following on from this, it would be useful to apply this type system to popular
real-world APIs such as PKCS #11, which has already received much attention from
the security API analysis community, [Clulow, 2003b], [Tsalapati, 2007], [Delaune
et al., 2008], [Centenaro et al., 2012].
Data integrity is another security property which our type system could be extended
to handle. Confidentiality and non-interference are concerned only with data flows
from higher to lower security levels, whereas integrity considers how low-security data
may influence the values of high-security data.
One area which we were unable to address in this thesis is that of untyped adversary
code. That is, to show that any sequence of well-typed API calls would maintain the
desired security properties, even when the adversary was attempting to subvert the
types of function inputs. One approach would be to ensure that the API code enforces
the input types, rather than simply assuming that they hold — comparable to secure
compilation (e.g., [Fournet and Rezk, 2008]).
On a similar note, our type system does not consider insecure information flows
arising from specific memory updates (i.e., when some confidential value controls
which one of two publicly accessible locations are updated). As this is a temporal
property, any static analysis would have to include a record of which locations could
be modified by an expression, and ensure that changes to confidential values did not
affect this set.
Finally, it would be beneficial to have an implementation of the type system that
enabled an API design to be automatically type-checked, either using a stand-alone
verifier, or interactively in an editor similar to what exists for traditional programming
languages in IDEs such as Eclipse.
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This appendix contains the full proofs of the lemmas and theorems which were omitted
from the main body of the Thesis. In the proofs which follow, underlined statements
correspond to those results that must hold for the theorem or lemma to be true. Recall
that the security properties only hold for terminating expressions.
A.1 Confidentiality
Here, we present the definitions and full proofs of the lemmas and theorems which are
required for the proof of Theorem 4.17 (Confidentiality Preservation).
A.1.1 Lemmas
Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation).
If T <: 〈E, l〉 then T ≡ 〈E, l′〉 where l′≤ l.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of T <: T′ By inspection of the
subtyping rules, there are two possible cases for the rule at the root of the derivation:
• Case S-ST:
Here, T = 〈E, l′〉, where l′≤ l, therefore the result is immediate.
• Case S-REFL:
Here, T = T′ = 〈E, l〉. Since E <: E follows via S-REFL and l ≤ l is true, the
result holds.
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Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation for Values).
1. If `lw c : T w.r.t. Σ then T = 〈data, l′〉, where c : 〈data, l〉 ∈ Σ and (lglw)≤ l′
2. If `lw a : T w.r.t. Σ then T = 〈S loc, l′〉, where a : 〈S loc, l〉 ∈ Σ, lw ≤ bSc and
(lglw)≤ l′
3. If `lw k : T w.r.t. Σ then T = 〈l1 l2 key, l〉, where k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 ∈ Σ and
lw ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 ≤ l
4. If `lw ctxt(n, k, v) : T w.r.t. Σ then `lw k : 〈b〈E, l〉c l key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ,
`lw v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ and T = 〈enc(〈E, l〉), l′〉
5. If `lw TRUE : T then T = 〈bool, l〉, where lw ≤ l
6. If `lw FALSE : T then T = 〈bool, l〉, where lw ≤ l
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of `lw v : T
1. Here v = c therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-CNST or T-SUB
must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-CNST:
Here, we have T = 〈data, lglw〉 and c : 〈data, l〉 ∈ Σ therefore the result is
immediate, since (lglw) ≤ (lglw).
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w c : S′
lw ≤ l′w
S′<: T
By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈data, l′′〉
c : 〈data, l〉 ∈ Σ
(lgl′w) ≤ l′′
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈data, l′〉
l′′≤ l′
By the properties of g:
(lglw) ≤ (lgl′w) ⇒ (lglw) ≤ l′
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2. Here v = a therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-LOC or T-SUB
must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-LOC:
Here, we have T = 〈S loc, lglw〉, lw ≤ bSc and a : 〈data, l〉 ∈ Σ therefore the
result is immediate, since (lglw) ≤ (lglw).
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w a : S′′
lw ≤ l′w
S′<: T
By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈S loc, l′′〉
l′w ≤ bSc ⇒ lw ≤ bSc
a : 〈S loc, l〉 ∈ Σ
(lgl′w) ≤ l′′
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈S loc, l′〉
l′′≤ l′
By the properties of g:
(lglw) ≤ (lgl′w) ⇒ (lglw) ≤ l′
3. Here v = k therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-KEY or T-SUB
must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-KEY:
Here, we have T = 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉, k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 ∈ Σ, l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 and lw =
l1, therefore the result is immediate.
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w k : S′
lw ≤ l′w
S′<: T
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By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈l1 l2 key, l′〉
k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 ∈ Σ
l′w ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 ≤ l′ ⇒ lw ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 ≤ l′
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈l1 l2 key, l〉
l′≤ l ⇒ lw ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 ≤ l
4. Here, v = ctxt(n, k, vm) therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-CTXT
or T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-CTXT:
Here, we have T = 〈enc(〈E, l〉),⊥〉, `lw k : 〈b〈E, l〉c l key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ and
`lw vm : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ, therefore the result is immediate.
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w ctxt(n, k, vm) : S′ w.r.t. Σ
S′<: T
By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈enc(〈E, l〉), l′′〉
`l′w k : 〈b〈E, l〉c l key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
`l′w vm : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈enc(〈E, l〉), l′〉
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`lw k : 〈b〈E, l〉c l key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
`lw vm : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
5. Here, v = TRUE therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-TRUE or
T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-TRUE:
Here, we have T = 〈bool, lw〉 therefore the result is immediate.
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• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w TRUE : S′
S′<: T
lw ≤ l′w
By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈bool, l′〉
l′w ≤ l′ ⇒ lw ≤ l′
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈bool, l〉
l′≤ l ⇒ lw ≤ l
6. Here, v = FALSE therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-FALSE or
T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation.
• Case T-FALSE:
Here, we have T = 〈bool, lw〉 therefore the result is immediate.
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
`l′w FALSE : S′
S′<: T
lw ≤ l′w
By the induction hypothesis:
S′ = 〈bool, l′〉
l′w ≤ l′ ⇒ lw ≤ l′
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
T = 〈bool, l〉
l′≤ l ⇒ lw ≤ l
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Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms).
1. If `lw v : 〈data, l〉 w.r.t. Σ then v is of the form c
2. If `lw v : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ then v is of the form TRUE or FALSE
3. If `lw v : 〈S loc, l〉 w.r.t. Σ then v is of the form a
4. If `lw v : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 w.r.t. Σ then v is of the form k
5. If `lw v : 〈enc(S), l〉 w.r.t. Σ then v is of the form ctxt(n, k, vm)
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ.
1. Here S = 〈data, l〉 therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-CNST or
T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation. In the former case, we have v = c
thus the result is immediate. In the latter case, we have `l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ, where
S′<: 〈data, l〉. It follows from Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtyping Relation)
that S′≡ 〈data, l′〉 therefore the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
2. Here S = 〈bool, l〉 therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, T-TRUE, T-FALSE
or T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation. In the first two cases, we have v =
TRUE and v = FALSE respectively, thus the result is immediate. In the third case,
we have `l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ, where S′<: 〈bool, l〉. It follows from Lemma A.1 (In-
version of the Subtyping Relation) that S′≡ 〈bool, l′〉 therefore the result follows
from the induction hypothesis.
3. Here S = 〈S loc, l〉 therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-LOC or
T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation. In the former case, we have v = a
thus the result is immediate. In the latter case, we have `l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ, where
S′<: 〈S loc, l〉. It follows from Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtyping Relation)
that S′≡ 〈S loc, l′〉 therefore the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
4. Here S = 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-KEY
or T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation. In the former case, we have v = k
thus the result is immediate. In the latter case, we have `l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ, where
S′ <: 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉. It follows from Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtyping
Relation) that S′≡ 〈l1 l2 key, l′3〉 therefore the result follows from the induction
hypothesis.
5. Here S = 〈enc(Sm), l〉 therefore, by inspection of the typing rules, either T-CTXT
or T-SUB must be at the root of the derivation. In the former case, we have v =
ctxt(n, k, vm) thus the result is immediate. In the latter case, we have `l′w v : S′
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w.r.t. Σ, where S′<: 〈enc(Sm), l〉. It follows from Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the
Subtyping Relation) that S′≡ 〈enc(Sm), l′〉 therefore the result follows from the
induction hypothesis.
Lemma A.4 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level).
If `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ then `bSc v : S w.r.t. Σ.
Proof.
By induction on the form of S.
• Case 〈data, l〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = c
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
c : 〈data, l′〉 ∈ Σ
(l′glw)≤ l
By the properties of g:
l′≤ l ⇒ (l′gl) = l
By Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type):
b〈data, l〉c = l
By T-CNST:
`l c : 〈data, l〉 ≡ `bSc v : S
• Case 〈bool, l〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
By Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type):
b〈bool, l〉c = l
By T-TRUE or T-FALSE:
`l v : 〈bool, l〉 ≡ `bSc v : S
• Case 〈S′ loc, l〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = a
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By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈S′ loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ
(l′glw)≤ l ⇒ l′ ≤ l
By T-LOC:
`bS′c a : 〈S′ loc, (l′gbS′c)〉
By the properties of g:
(l′gbS′c) ≤ l′ ⇒ (l′gbS′c) ≤ l
By Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type):
b〈S′ loc, l〉c = bS′cf l ⇒ bSc ≤ bS′c
By T-SUB, S-ST and S-REFL:
`bSc a : 〈S′ loc, l〉 ≡ `bSc v : S
• Case 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = k
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
k : 〈l1 l2 key, l′3〉 ∈ Σ
l′3 ≤ l3
By Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type):
b〈l1 l2 key, l3〉c = l1
By T-KEY:
`l1 k : 〈l1 l2 key, l
′
3〉
By T-SUB, S-ST and S-REFL:
`l1 k : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 ≡ `bSc v : S
• Case 〈enc(Sm), l〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = ctxt(n, k, vm)
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By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
`lw k : 〈bSmc lm key,>〉
`lw vm : Sm
lw ≤ bSmc ≤ lm
 where Sm = 〈Em, lm〉
By Definition 4.13 (Minimum Level of a Security Type):
b〈bSmc lm key,>〉c = bSmc
b〈enc(Sm), l〉c = (bSmcf l) ⇒ bSc ≤ bSmc
By the induction hypothesis:
`bSmc k : 〈bSmc lm key,>〉
`bSmc vm : Sm
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`bSc k : 〈bSmc lm key,>〉
`bSc vm : Sm
By T-CTXT:
`bSc ctxt(n, k, vm) : 〈enc(Sm),⊥〉
By T-SUB and S-ST and S-REFL:
`bSc ctxt(n, k, vm) : 〈enc(Sm), l〉 ≡ `bSc v : S
Lemma A.5 (Lower Bound on Security Level of Non-Ciphertext Types).
If `lw v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ, E 6≡ enc(S) and Σ is valid then lw ≤ l.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of `lw v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ.
• Cases T-CNST and T-LOC:
Here, l = (lglw) therefore the result is immediate.
• Cases T-TRUE and T-FALSE:
Here, l = lw therefore the result is immediate.
• Case T-KEY:
Here, we have E = l1 l2 key, lw = l1 and l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l, therefore the result follows
immediately.
• Case T-CTXT:
This case cannot occur as we have E 6≡ enc(S) as one of the preconditions.
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• Case T-SUB:
Here, we have `l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ, where lw ≤ l′w and S′<: 〈E, l〉. It follows from
Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtyping Relation) that S′ = 〈E, l′〉, where l′≤ l.
For each instance of E that is not of the form enc(S), it follows by the same
lemma that E′ 6≡ enc(S). Consequently, the induction hypothesis applies and we
get l′w ≤ l′, thus the result follows from the transitivity of ≤.
Lemma 4.19 (Upper Bound on Security Level of Well-Typed Values)
For any valid typing domain (Γ, Σ) and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), it follows from `lw v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ that lvl∆(v) ≤ l.




〈E, l〉 = 〈data, l′glw〉
c : 〈data, l′〉 ∈ Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
c : l′ ∈ ∆
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(c) = l′
By the properties of g:
l′ ≤ (l′glw) ⇒ l′ ≤ l ⇒ lvl∆(c) ≤ l ≡ lvl∆(v) ≤ l
• Cases T-LOC, T-TRUE and T-FALSE:
We have:
v = a, TRUE, FALSE (respectively)
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(v) = ⊥ ⇒ lvl∆(v) ≤ l




〈E, l〉 = 〈l1 l2 key, l〉
k : 〈l1 l2 key, l〉 ∈ Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
k : l ∈ ∆
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(k) = l ⇒ lvl∆(k) ≤ l ≡ lvl∆(v) ≤ l
• Case T-CTXT:
We have:
v = ctxt(n, vk, vm)
〈E, l〉 = 〈enc(〈E′, l′〉),⊥〉
`lw vk : 〈l′′ l′ key,>〉
`lw vm : 〈E′, l′〉
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
vk is of the form k
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation for Values):
vk : 〈l′′ l′ key, lk〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ l′′ ≤ l′ ≤ lk
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
vk : lk ∈ ∆
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(vk) = lk ⇒ lvl∆(vk) ≥ l′
By application of the induction hypothesis to `lw vm : 〈E′, l′〉:
lvl∆(vm) ≤ l′
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(ctxt(n, vk, vm)) = ⊥ ⇒ lvl∆(ctxt(n, vk, vm)) ≤ l ≡ lvl∆(v) ≤ l
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• Case T-SUB:
We have:
Γ `l′w v : S′
Γ ⊆ /0 ⇒ Γ = /0
S′<: 〈E, l〉
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Subtype Relation):
S′ is of the form 〈E, l′〉
l′≤ l
By an application of the induction hypothesis:
lvl∆(v) ≤ l′ ⇒ lvl∆(v) ≤ l
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A.1.2 Theorems
Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety)
For any valid typing domain (Γ, Σ) and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), if Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ then either e is a value, or there exists some
final state 〈∆′, v〉 such that Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉, (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′) and `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of Γ `lw e : S:
• Cases T-CNST, T-TRUE, T-FALSE, T-LOC, T-KEY and T-CTXT:




S = 〈E, lglw〉
Γ = [x : 〈E, l〉]
lw ≤ b〈E, lglw〉c
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
(x 7→ v′) ∈ Π
`⊥ v′ : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
Consequently, E-VAR applies and we get:
v = v′
∆′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By the properties of g:
l ≤ (lglw)
By T-SUB:
`⊥ v : S w.r.t. Σ
By Lemma A.4 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level):
`bSc v : S w.r.t. Σ
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
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• Case T-SENC:
We have:
e = senc(ek, em)
S = 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),⊥〉
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
Γ `lw em : 〈Em, lm〉 w.r.t. Σ
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-SENC may apply, in which case ek
will be evaluated first, followed by em. By the induction hypothesis, either ek is
a value, or there exists some state 〈∆′′, vk〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, vk〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw vk : 〈l′ lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
If ek is a value, we have:
vk = ek
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
In both cases, it follows from Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms) that:
vk = k
By a second application of the induction hypothesis, either em is a value, or there
exists some state 〈∆′′′, vm〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, em〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, vm〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`lw vm : 〈Em, lm〉 w.r.t. Σ
If em is a value, we have:
vm = em
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
Consequently, E-SENC does apply and we get:
v = ctxt(n, k, vm) for some n 6∈ ∆′′′
∆′ = (∆′′′∪ n) ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-CTXT:
`lw ctxt(n, k, vm) : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),⊥〉 w.r.t. Σ ≡ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
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• Case T-SDEC:
We have:
e = try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
Γ `lw ec : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉 w.r.t. Σ
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `(l′glw) e1 : S w.r.t. Σ
Γ `(l′glw) e2 : S w.r.t. Σ
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 may apply.
In both cases, ek will be evaluated first, followed by ec, and then finally by either
e1 or e2. By the induction hypothesis, either ek is a value, or there exists some
state 〈∆′′, vk〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, vk〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw vk : 〈l′ lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
If ek is a value, we have:
vk = ek
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
In both cases, it follows from Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms) that:
vk = k
By a second application of the induction hypothesis, either ec is a value, or there
exists some state 〈∆′′′, vc〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, vc〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`lw vc : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉 w.r.t. Σ
If ec is a value, we have:
vc = ec
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
In both cases, it follows from Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms) that:
vc = ctxt(n, k′, v′m)
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By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
x 6∈ dom(Π)
If k = k′ then E-SDEC1 applies, otherwise E-SDEC2 applies.
1. E-SDEC1:
Here, vc is of the form ctxt(n, k, v′m) and e1 is evaluated next.
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
`lw v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
By Lemma A.4 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level):
`b〈Em, lm〉c v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v′m), ∆′′′)
By the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′′′, v′〉 such that:
Π∪(x 7→ v′m) ` 〈∆′′′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′′, v′〉
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v′m), ∆′′′′) ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′′)
`(l′glw) v′ : S w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v′ = e1
∆′′′′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ ((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v′m), ∆′′′′)
⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′′)
Consequently, E-SDEC1 does apply and we get:
v = v′ ⇒ `(l′glw) v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-SUB, S-REFL and the properties of g:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
2. E-SDEC2:
Here, vc is of the form ctxt(n, k′, v′m), where k
′ 6= k, and e2 is evaluated next.
By the induction hypothesis, either e2 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′′′, v′〉 such that:
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Π ` 〈∆′′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′′, v′〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′′)
`(l′glw) v′ : S w.r.t. Σ
If e2 is a value, we have:
v′ = e2
∆′′′′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′′)
Consequently, E-SDEC2 does apply and we get:
v = v′ ⇒ `(l′glw) v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-SUB, S-REFL and the properties of g:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
• Case T-LET:
We have:
e = let x = e1 in e2
Γ `lw e1 : S′
x 6∈ dom(Γ)
(Γ, x : S′) `lw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-LET may apply, in which case e1
will be evaluated first, followed by e2.
By the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′, v1〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v1〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
Γ `lw v1 : S′ w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v1 = e1
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
By Lemma A.4 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level):
`bS′c v1 : S′
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By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
x 6∈ dom(Π)
((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆′′)
By a second application of the induction hypothesis, either e2 is a value, or there
exists some state 〈∆′′′, v2〉 such that:
Π∪(x 7→ v1) ` 〈∆′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v2〉
((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆′′′)
`lw v2 : S w.r.t. Σ
If e2 is a value, we have:
v2 = e2
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ ((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆′′′)
Consequently, E-LET does apply and we get:
v = v2 ⇒ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ ((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆′) ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
• Case T-IF:
We have:
e = if e1 then e2 else e3
Γ `lw e1 : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
Γ `(lwgl) e2 : S w.r.t. Σ
Γ `(lwgl) e3 : S w.r.t. Σ
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-IF1 or E-IF2 may apply, where
e1 will be evaluated first, followed by either e2 or e3.
By the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′, v1〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v1〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw v1 : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v1 = e1
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
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By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v1 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
1. If v1 = TRUE, only E-IF1 may apply, in which case e2 is evaluated next.
By the induction hypothesis, either e2 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′′, v2〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v2〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`(lwgl) v2 : S w.r.t. Σ
If e2 is a value, we have:
v2 = e2
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
Consequently, E-IF1 does apply and we get:
v = v2 ⇒ `(lwgl) v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-SUB, S-REFL and the properties of g:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
2. If v1 = FALSE, only E-IF2 may apply, in which case e3 is evaluated next.
By the induction hypothesis, either e3 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′′, v3〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v3〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`(lwgl) v3 : S w.r.t. Σ
If e3 is a value, we have:
v3 = e3
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
Consequently, E-IF2 does apply and we get:
v = v3 ⇒ `(lwgl) v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-SUB, S-REFL and the properties of g:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
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• Case T-EQ:
We have:
e = e1 == e2
S = 〈bool, l〉
Γ `lw e1 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
Γ `lw e2 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By inspection of the evaluation relation, either E-EQ1 or E-EQ2 may apply,
where e1 will be evaluated first, followed by e2.
By the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆′′, v1〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v1〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw v1 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v1 = e1
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
By Lemma A.5 (Lower Bound on Security Level of Non-Ciphertext Types):
lw ≤ l
By a second application of the induction hypothesis, either e2 is a value, or there
exists some state 〈∆′′′, v2〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v2〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`lw v2 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
If e2 is a value, we have:
v2 = e2
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
1. If v1 = v2 then E-EQ1 applies and we get:
v = TRUE
∆′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
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By T-TRUE:
`l TRUE : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`lw TRUE : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ ≡ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
2. If v1 6= v2 then E-EQ2 applies and we get:
v = FALSE
∆′ = ∆′′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By T-FALSE:
`l FALSE : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`lw FALSE : 〈bool, l〉 w.r.t. Σ ≡ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
• Case T-ASGN:
We have:
e = e1 := e2
Γ `lw e1 : 〈S loc,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
Γ `lw e2 : S w.r.t. Σ
By inspection of the evaluation relation, only E-ASGN may apply, in which case
e1 will be evaluated first, followed by e2. By the induction hypothesis, either e1
is a value, or there exists some state 〈∆′′, v1〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v1〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw v1 : 〈S loc,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v1 = e1
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
By a second application of the induction hypothesis, either e2 is a value, or there
exists some state 〈∆′′′, v2〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆′′, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′′, v2〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
`lw v2 : S w.r.t. Σ
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If e2 is a value, we have:
v2 = e2
∆′′′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′′)
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v1 = a
Consequently, E-ASGN does apply and we get:
v = v2 ⇒ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆′ = ∆′′′[a 7→ v ]
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`⊥ v2 : S w.r.t. Σ ≡ `⊥ v : S w.r.t. Σ
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈S loc, l〉 ∈ Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):




S = 〈E, lglw〉
Γ `lw e′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
lw ≤ b〈E, lglw〉c
By inspection of the evaluation relation, only E-DREF may apply. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, either e′ is a value, or there exists some state 〈∆′′, v′〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e′〉 ⇓ 〈∆′′, v′〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
`lw v′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
If e′ is a value, we have:
v′ = e′
∆′′ = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′′)
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v′ = a
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Consequently, E-DREF does apply and we get:
v = ∆′′(a)
∆′ = ∆′′ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈〈E, l〉 loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ b〈E, l〉c
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
`⊥ ∆′′(a) : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By Lemma A.4 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level):
`b〈E, l〉c v : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
By T-SUB:
`lw v : 〈E, lglw〉 w.r.t. Σ ≡ `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
• Case T-FNAPP:
We have:
e = f (ei i∈1..n)
f : {i : Si i∈1..n} l
′
w→〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ l′w
∀i∈1..n Γ `lw ei : Si
By inspection of the evaluation relation, only E-FNAPP may apply, in which
case the parameter expressions (if present) are evaluated in left-to-right order,
followed by the function body. If n = 0 then we proceed straight to dealing with
the function body, otherwise we must first consider the parameter expressions.
By the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value, or there exists some state
〈∆1, v1〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
`lw v1 : S1 w.r.t. Σ
If e1 is a value, we have:
v1 = e1
∆1 = ∆ ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
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The induction hypothesis can therefore be applied to each parameter in order,
giving us:
Π ` 〈∆i−1, ei〉 ⇓ 〈∆i, vi〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆i)
`lw vi : Si w.r.t. Σ
 ∀i∈1..n (where ∆0 = ∆)
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆n
(Γ, x′i : Si) `l′w [x′i /xi ]ef : S
}
where x′i 6∈ dom(Γ) and x′i 6∈ FV(ef )
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
∀i∈1..n `⊥ vi : Si w.r.t. Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
x′i 6∈ dom(Π)
((Γ, x′i : Si), Σ)' ((Π ∪ x′i 7→ vi), ∆n)
By Assumption 4.16, either ef is a value, or there exists some state 〈∆r, v〉 such
that:
(Π ∪ x′i 7→ vi) ` 〈∆, ef 〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
((Γ, x′i : Si), Σ)' ((Π ∪ x′i 7→ vi), ∆r) ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆r)
`l′w v : S w.r.t. Σ
If ef is a value, we have:
v = ef ⇒ `l′w v : S w.r.t. Σ
∆r = ∆n ⇒ (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆r)
In both cases, we have (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆r) and `l′w v : S w.r.t. Σ. The final part of the
result therefore follows from T-SUB and S-REFL:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
• Case T-SUB:
We have:
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If e is not a value, it follows from the induction hypothesis that there exists some
state 〈∆′, v〉 such that:
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′, v〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆′)
`l′w v : S′ w.r.t. Σ
By T-SUB:
`lw v : S w.r.t. Σ
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A.2 Non-Interference
Here, we present the definitions and full proofs of the lemmas and theorems which are
required for the proof of Theorem 4.20 (Non-Interferent Expression).
A.2.1 Definitions
Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values).
Two values, v and v′, are defined to be indistinguishable at the observation level
l with type S, written v≈l v′: S, when one or more of the following conditions hold:
• v = v′
• v≈l v′ : 〈data, l′〉 if l′ > l
• v≈l v′ : 〈bool, l′〉 if l′ > l
• v≈l v′ : 〈S loc, l′〉 if l′ > l and (∀v1,v2 s.t. `⊥ v1 : S and `⊥ v2 : S, v1≈l v2 : S)a
• k≈l k′ : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 if l1 > l
• ctxt(n, k, vm)≈l ctxt(n′, k′, v′m) : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′〉 if k≈l k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
and vm≈l v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
aor equivalently: v≈l v′ : 〈S loc, l′〉 if l′ > l and bSc> l (since we get `bSc v1 : S and `bSc v2 : S
via Lemma A.4, and v1≈l v2 : S via Lemma 4.24)
Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments).
With respect to some typing environment Σ, two evaluation environments ∆1
and ∆2, are defined to be indistinguishable at the observation level l, written
Σ `∆1≈l ∆2, when both of the following rules hold:
• dom(∆1) = dom(∆2)
• ((a 7→ v1) ∈ ∆1 ∧ (a 7→ v2) ∈ ∆2)→ v1≈l v2 : S (where a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ)
• f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆1 ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆2
Definition A.8 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts).
With respect to some typing context Γ, two evaluation contexts Π1 and Π2, are
defined to be indistinguishable at the observation level l, written Γ `Π1≈l Π2,
when both of the following rules hold:
• ((x 7→ v1) ∈Π1 ∧ (x 7→ v2) ∈Π2)→ v1≈l v2 : S (where x : S ∈ Γ)
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A.2.2 Lemmas
Lemma A.9 (Widening of Typed Indistinguishability for Values).
If v≈l v′: S, l′≤ l and S <: S′ then v≈l′ v′: S′.
Proof. By case-analysis on the rules which define v≈l v′ : S.
• Case v = v′
This rule does not take account of l or S, therefore this case still applies and the
result holds.
• Case v≈l v′ : 〈data, l′′〉 where l′′> l
By inspection of the subtyping rules, we get that S′ = 〈data, l′′′〉 where l′′′ ≥ l′′.
Consequently, it follows from the transitivity of > and ≥ that l′′′ > l′, therefore
this case still applies and the result holds.
• Case v≈l v′ : 〈bool, l′′〉 where l′′> l
By inspection of the subtyping rules, we get that S′ = 〈bool, l′′′〉 where l′′′ ≥ l′′.
Consequently, it follows from the transitivity of > and ≥ that l′′′ > l′, therefore
this case still applies and the result holds.
• Case v≈l v′ : 〈S′′ loc, lk〉 where l′′ > l and v1≈l v2 : S′′
By inspection of the subtyping rules, we get that S′ = 〈S′′ loc, l′′′〉 where l′′′ ≥ l′′.
Consequently, it follows from the transitivity of > and ≥ that l′′′ > l′, therefore
this case still applies and the result holds.
• Case k≈l k′ : 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉 where l1 > l
By inspection of the subtyping rules, we get that S′ = 〈l1 l2 key, l′3〉, therefore this
case still applies and the result holds.
• Case ctxt(n, k, vm)≈l ctxt(n′, k′, v′m) : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′′〉where k≈l k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
and vm≈l v′m : 〈Em, lm〉:
By inspection of the subtyping rules, S′ = 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′′′〉, where l′′≤ l′′′.
By the induction hypothesis, we get k≈l′ k′ : Sk where 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
<: Sk. By inspection of the subtyping rules, Sk = 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉. By
inspection of Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values), we must
have either k = k′ or l′<b〈Em, lm〉c. In the latter case we get b〈Em, lm〉c ≤ lm
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via Definition 4.13 therefore l′ < lm follows via the transitivity of < and ≤,
thus k≈l′ k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉 holds in both cases. By another applica-
tion of the induction hypothesis, we get vm≈l′ v′m : 〈Em, lm〉. We therefore get
ctxt(n, k, vm)≈l′ ctxt(n′, k′, v′m) : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′′′〉 from the rule in this case and
thus the result holds.
Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values)
If `lw v : S w.r.t. Σ, `lw v′ : S w.r.t. Σ, Σ is valid and l < lw then v≈l v′ : S.
Proof. By induction on the form of S.
• Cases 〈data, l′〉 and 〈bool, l′〉:
By Lemma A.5 (Lower Bound on the Security Level of Non-Ciphertext Types):
lw ≤ l′ ⇒ l < l′
Consequently, the result follows from the second or third rule in Definition A.6 (Typed
Indistinguishability of Values).
• Case 〈S′ loc, l′〉:
By Lemma A.5 (Lower Bound on the Security Level of Non-Ciphertext Types):
lw ≤ l′ ⇒ l < l′
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = a
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈S′ loc, l′′〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ bS′c ⇒ l < bS′c
Taking any v1 and v2 such that `⊥ v1 : S′ and `⊥ v2 : S′, it follows from Lemma A.4
(Sufficient Minimum Write Level) that:
`bS′c v1 : S′
`bS′c v2 : S′
By the induction hypothesis:
v1≈l v2 : S′
Consequently, the result follows from the fourth rule in Definition A.6 (Typed
Indistinguishability of Values).
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• Case 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = k
v′ = k′
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
lw ≤ l1 ⇒ l < l1
Consequently, the result follows from the fifth rule in Definition A.6 (Typed
Indistinguishability of Values).
• Case 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′〉:
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v = ctxt(n, k, vm)
v′ = ctxt(n′, k′, v′m)
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
`lw k : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
`lw vm : 〈Em, lm〉
and
`lw k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
`lw v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
By the induction hypothesis:
k≈l k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
vm≈l v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
Consequently, the result follows from the final rule in Definition A.6 (Typed
Indistinguishability of Values).
Lemma A.10 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Values).
If v1≈l v2 : S and v2≈l v3 : S then v1≈l v3 : S.
Proof.
By induction over the rules which define v1≈l v2 : S:
• Case v1 = v2:
Here, v2≈l v3 : S is equivalent to v1≈l v3 : S, therefore the result is immediate.
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• Cases S ∈ {〈data, l′〉, 〈bool, l′〉, 〈S′ loc, l′〉, 〈l1 l2 key, l3〉}:
In these cases, the relation only depends upon the observation level and type, not
the specific values, therefore the result follows from an application of the same
rule.
• Case S = 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l′〉:
Here, we have:
v1 = ctxt(n1, k1, v′1)
v2 = ctxt(n2, k2, v′2)
v3 = ctxt(n3, k3, v′3)
k1≈l k2 : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
k2≈l k3 : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
v′1≈l v′2 : 〈Em, lm〉
v′2≈l v′3 : 〈Em, lm〉
By the induction hypothesis, we get:
k1≈l k3 : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
v′1≈l v′3 : 〈Em, lm〉
Consequently, the result follows from the final rule in Definition A.6 (Typed
Indistinguishability for Values).
Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Environments).
If Σ `∆1≈l ∆2 and Σ `∆2≈l ∆3 then Σ `∆1≈l ∆3.





⇒ dom(Π1) = dom(Π3)
((a 7→ v1) ∈ ∆1 ∧ (a 7→ v2) ∈ ∆2)→ v1≈l v2 : S (where a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ)
((a′ 7→ v′2) ∈ ∆2 ∧ (a′ 7→ v′3) ∈ ∆3)→ v′2≈l v′3 : S′ (where a′ : 〈S′ loc, l′′〉 ∈ Σ)
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆1 ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆2
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆2 ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆3
It therefore follows from the transitivity of↔ that:
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆1 ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆3
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It therefore follows from the equality of domains that, ∀a ∈ dom(∆i):
∆1[a]≈l ∆2[a] : S
∆2[a]≈l ∆3[a] : S
}
(where a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ)
Finally, by Lemma A.10 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Values):
∀a ∈ dom(∆1) ∆1[a]≈l ∆3[a] : S (where a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ)
Lemma A.12 (Preservation Under Evaluation of Typed Indistinguishability for Evalu-
ation Environments).
If (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ and Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉 then Σ `∆≈l ∆r for
all l < lw.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ.
• Cases T-CNST, T-TRUE, T-FALSE, T-LOC, T-KEY and T-CTXT:
Here, e is a value therefore, by inspection of the evaluation rules, E-VAL must
be at the root of the evaluation, thus ∆r = ∆ and the result holds.
• Case T-VAR:
Here, e is a variable therefore, by inspection of the evaluation rules, E-VAR must
be at the root of the evaluation, thus ∆r = ∆ and the result holds.
• Case T-LET:
Here, we have:
e = let x = e1 in e2
Γ `lw e1 : S′
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : S′) `lw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, we must have E-LET at the root of the
evaluation, thus:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
Π∪ (x 7→ v1) ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
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By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆1)
By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆r
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Case T-SENC:
Here, we have:
e = senc(ek, em)
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Γ `lw em : 〈Em, lm〉
By inspection of the evaluation rules, we must have E-SENC at the root of the
evaluation, thus:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, k〉
Π ` 〈∆1, em〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, vm〉
∆r = ∆2∪n
n 6∈ ∆2
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆2
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆2
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l (∆2∪n) ≡ ∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
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• Case T-SDEC:
Here, we have:
e = try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Γ `lw ec : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `l′glw e1 : S
Γ `l′glw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 may be at
the root of the evaluation. In both cases, the key and ciphertext expressions are
evaluated in that order, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, k〉
Π ` 〈∆1, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, vc〉
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆2
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆2)
By the properties of g:
lw ≤ (l′glw) ⇒ l < (l′glw)
We now split on which rule is at the root of the evaluation:
• Subcase E-SDEC1:
In this subcase, we have:
vc = ctxt(n, k, vm)
Π∪ (x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
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By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw vc : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
`lw vm : 〈Em, lm〉
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ vm), ∆2)
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < (l′g lw). Σ `∆2≈l ∆r ⇒ ∀l < lw. Σ `∆2≈l ∆r
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation
Environments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Subcase E-SDEC2:
In this subcase, we have:
Π ` 〈∆2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < (l′g lw). Σ `∆2≈l ∆r ⇒ ∀l < lw. Σ `∆2≈l ∆r
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation
Environments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Case T-IF:
Here, we have:
e = if e1 then e2 else e3
Γ `lw e1 : 〈bool, l′〉
Γ `l′glw e2 : S
Γ `l′glw e3 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-IF1 or E-IF2 may be at the root
of the evaluation. In both cases, the guard expression will have been evaluated
first, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
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By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
By the properties of g:
lw ≤ (l′glw) ⇒ l < (l′glw)
If the rule at the root of the evaluation is E-IF1, we have:
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Otherwise, the rule at the root of the evaluation is E-IF2 and we have:
Π ` 〈∆1, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
In both cases, it follows from the induction hypothesis that:
∀l < (l′g lw). Σ `∆1≈l ∆r ⇒ ∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆r
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Case T-EQ:
Here, we have:
e = e1 == e2
Γ `lw e1 : 〈E, l′〉
Γ `lw e2 : 〈E, l′〉
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-EQ1 or E-EQ2 may be at the root
of the evaluation. In both cases, the two sub-expressions will have been evalu-
ated in left-to-right order, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v2〉
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
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By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆2
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Case T-ASGN:
Here, we have:
e = e1 := e2
Γ `lw e1 : 〈S loc,>〉
Γ `lw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, we must have E-ASGN at the root of the
evaluation, thus:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, a〉
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, v〉
∆r = ∆2[a 7→ v]
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆1
By two applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
`lw a : 〈S loc,>〉
and `lw v : S
By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
∀l < lw. Σ `∆1≈l ∆2
By Lemma A.1 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ bSc ⇒ ∀l < lw. l < bSc
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
`⊥ ∆[a] : S
By Lemma A.1 (Sufficient Minimum Write Level):
`bSc ∆[a] : S
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By Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values):
∀l < lw. ∆(a)≈l v : S
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):




Γ `lw e′ : S′
By inspection of the evaluation rules, we must have E-DREF at the root of the
evaluation, thus:
Π ` 〈∆, e′〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, a〉
The result therefore follows from the induction hypothesis.
• Case T-FNAPP:
Here, we have:
e = f (ei i∈1..n)
f : {i : Si i∈1..n} l
′
w→〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ l′w
∀i∈1..n Γ `lw ei : Si
By inspection of the evaluation rules, we must have E-FNAPP at the root of the
evaluation, thus:
∀i∈1..n Π ` 〈∆i−1, ei〉 ⇓ 〈∆i, vi〉
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆n




x′i 6∈ FV(ef )
By n applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw vi : Si
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆i)
}
∀i∈1..n
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By n applications of the induction hypothesis:
∀l ≤ lw. Σ `∆i−1≈lo ∆i ∀i∈1..n
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`⊥ vi : Si w.r.t. Σ
`⊥ v′i : Si w.r.t. Σ
}
∀i∈1..n
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
x′i 6∈ dom(Γ)
(Γ, x′i : Si) `l′w [x′i /xi ]ef : S
((Γ, x′i : Si), Σ)' ((Π ∪ x′i 7→ vi), ∆n)
By the induction hypothesis:
∀l ≤ l′w. Σ `∆n≈lo ∆r ⇒ ∀l ≤ lw. Σ `∆n≈lo ∆r
By Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
∀l < lw. Σ `∆≈l ∆r
• Case T-SUB:
Here, we have Γ `l′w e : S′ w.r.t. Σ and lw ≤ l′w, therefore l < l′w and the result
follows from the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 4.22 (Indistinguishability)
If `lw v1 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ, `lw v2 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ and v1≈lo v2 : 〈E, l〉 then, for any
typing context Γ and evaluation domain (Π, ∆) where (Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), it follows
from lo ≥ l that ∆ ` v1≈lo v2.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of `lw v1 : 〈E, l〉 w.r.t. Σ
• Case c:
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
E = data
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v2 = c′
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability):
v1 = v2 or lo < l
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Since we have lo ≥ l as a precondition, we must have v1 = v2. Consequently, the
result follows from the first rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
• Cases TRUE and FALSE:
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
E = bool
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v2 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability):
v1 = v2 or lo < l
Since we have lo ≥ l as a precondition, we must have v1 = v2. Consequently, the
result follows from the first rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
• Case a:
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
E = S loc
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v2 = a′




∀v,v′ s.t. `⊥ v : S and `⊥ v′ : S, v≈lo v′ : S
Since we have lo ≥ l as a precondition, we must have v1 = v2. Consequently, the
result follows from the first rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
• Case k:
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
E = l1 l2 key
l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l
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By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v2 = k′
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability):
v1 = v2 or lo < l1
Since we have lo ≥ l as a precondition, and l ≥ l1, we must have v1 = v2. Con-
sequently, the result follows from the first rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguisha-
bility of Values).
• Case ctxt(n, k, vm):
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
E = enc(〈Em, lm〉)
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v2 = ctxt(n′, k′, v′m)
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability):
v1 = v2
or
k≈lo k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉
vm≈lo v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
If v1 = v2 then the result follows immediately from the first rule in Definition 4.8
(Indistinguishability of Values).
Otherwise, by two applications of Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Rela-
tion):
`lw k : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
`lw k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key,>〉 w.r.t. Σ
By two further applications of Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
k : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key, lk〉 ∈ Σ
lm ≤ lk
k′ : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key, l′k〉 ∈ Σ
lm ≤ l′k
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By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
k : lk ∈ ∆
k′ : l′k ∈ ∆
By Definition 4.5 (Security Level Function):
lvl∆(k) = lk ⇒ lvl∆(k) ≥ lm
lvl∆(k′) = l′k ⇒ lvl∆(k′) ≥ lm
We now split on the relative ordering of lo and lm:
Subcase lo ≥ lm:
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability):
k = k′ or b〈Em, lm〉c > lo
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
k : 〈b〈Em, lm〉c lm key, lk〉 ∈ Σ
b〈Em, lm〉c ≤ lm ⇒ b〈Em, lm〉c ≤ lo
Consequently, we must have k = k′, therefore the result follows from the
third rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
Subcase lo 6≥ lm:
Here, we have lvl∆(k) 6≤ lo and lvl∆(k′) 6≤ lo, therefore the result follows
from the second rule in Definition 4.8 (Indistinguishability of Values).
Lemma 4.23 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments)
If Σ `∆1≈l ∆2, (Γ, Σ)' (Π1, ∆1) and (Γ, Σ)' (Π2, ∆2) then ∆1≈l ∆2.
Proof.
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
dom(∆1) = dom(∆2)
((a 7→ v1) ∈ ∆1 ∧ (a 7→ v2) ∈ ∆2)→ v1≈l v2 : S (where a : 〈S loc, l′〉 ∈ Σ)
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆1 ↔ f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆2 ⇒ F∆1 = F∆2 = F
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By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
c : 〈E′, l′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ c : l′ ∈ ∆1
c : 〈E′, l′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ c : l′ ∈ ∆2
k : 〈E′, l′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ k : l′ ∈ ∆1
k : 〈E′, l′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ k : l′ ∈ ∆2
a : 〈〈E′, l′〉 loc, l′′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ a : l′ ∈ ∆1, (a 7→ v1) ∈ ∆1 and `⊥ v1 : 〈E′, l′〉
a : 〈〈E′, l′〉 loc, l′′〉 ∈ Σ ↔ a : l′ ∈ ∆2, (a 7→ v2) ∈ ∆2 and `⊥ v2 : 〈E′, l′〉
Consequently:
c : l′ ∈ ∆1 ↔ c : l′ ∈ ∆2
k : l′ ∈ ∆1 ↔ k : l′ ∈ ∆2
a : l′ ∈ ∆1 ↔ a : l′ ∈ ∆2
 ⇒ L∆1 = L∆2 = L
(a 7→ v1) ∈ ∆1 ↔ (a 7→ v2) ∈ ∆2 ⇒ dom(φ∆1) = dom(φ∆2)
By Lemma 4.22 (Indistinguishability):
∀a : l′ ∈ L, l′ ≤ l→ L ` φ∆1[a]≈l φ∆2[a]
The result therefore follows from Definition 4.9 (Indistinguishability of Evaluation
Environments).
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A.2.3 Theorems
Theorem 4.21 (Non-Interference for Typed Expressions)
If Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ, Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉 and Π′ ` 〈∆′, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉, where
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆), (Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′), Σ is valid, Γ `Π≈lo Π′, Σ `∆≈lo ∆′ and lo ≤ lw,
then v≈lo v′ : S and Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the derivation of Γ `lw e : S w.r.t. Σ.
• Cases T-CNST, T-LOC, T-KEY, T-CTXT, T-TRUE and T-FALSE:
Here, e is a value therefore, by inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-VAL
could have been used at the root of each evaluation, thus:
v = e
v′ = e
By the first rule in Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values):
v≈lw v′ : S
• Case T-SENC:
We have:
e = senc(ek, em)
S = 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),⊥〉
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Γ `lw em : 〈Em, lm〉
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-SENC could have been used at the
root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, k〉
Π ` 〈∆1, em〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, vm〉




Π′ ` 〈∆′, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, k′〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, em〉 ⇓ 〈∆′2, v′m〉





By multiple applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆2)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′2)
Appendix A. Proofs 137
By two applications of the induction hypothesis, we get:
k≈lo k′ : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
and
vm≈lo v′m : 〈Em, lm〉
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆′2
By the fifth rule in Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values):
v≈lo v′ : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),⊥〉 ≡ v≈lo v′ : S
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
Σ ` (∆2∪n)≈lo (∆′2∪ n′) ≡ Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
• Case T-SDEC:
We have:
e = try sdec(ek, ec) = x in e1 else e2
Γ `lw ek : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
Γ `lw ec : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
l′ ≤ b〈Em, lm〉c
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `l′glw e1 : S
Γ `l′glw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 could have
been used at the root of each evaluation. In both cases, the key and ciphertext
expressions are evaluated in that order, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, k〉
Π ` 〈∆1, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, vc〉
and
Π′ ` 〈∆′, ek〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, k′〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, ec〉 ⇓ 〈∆′2, v′c〉
By multiple applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆2)
`lw vc : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′2)
`lw v′c : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉),>〉
By two applications of the induction hypothesis, we get:
k≈lo k′ : 〈l′ lm key, l〉
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
and
vc≈lo v′c : 〈enc(〈Em, lm〉), l〉
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆′2
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By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
vc = ctxt(n, k1, vm)
v′c = ctxt(n
′, k2, v′m)
By Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values):
k = k′ or lo < l′
k1 = k2 or lo < l′
We now split on the relative ordering of lo and l′:
• Subcase lo < l′:
By the properties of g:
lo < (l′glw)
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw k : 〈l′ lm key,>〉
In this subcase, each evaluation may have E-SDEC1 or E-SDEC2 at its
root, giving us:
v ∈ {v1, v2}
v′ ∈ {v′1, v′2}
where
Π∪ (x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v1〉
Π ` 〈∆2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v2〉
Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m) ` 〈∆′2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v2〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′2〉
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ vm), ∆2)
((Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉), Σ)' (Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m), ∆′2)
By two applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`l′glw v : S
`l′glw v′ : S
By Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
By two separate applications of Lemma A.12 (Preservation Under Evalua-
tion of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆r
Σ `∆′2≈lo ∆′r
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By two applications of Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguisha-
bility for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
• Subcase lo 6< l′:




⇒ k = k1 iff k′ = k2
As a result, both evaluations must have the same rule at their root, giving us:
Π∪ (x 7→ vm) ` 〈∆2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m) ` 〈∆′2, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
or
Π ` 〈∆2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′2, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
By Definition A.8 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts):
(Γ, x : 〈Em, lm〉) `Π∪ (x 7→ vm)≈lo Π′∪ (x 7→ v′m)
Consequently, for each of the two possible outcomes, the result follows
from the induction hypothesis.
• Case T-IF:
We have:
e = if e1 then e2 else e3
Γ `lw e1 : 〈bool, l〉
Γ `lglw e2 : S
Γ `lglw e3 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-IF1 or E-IF2 could have been
used at the root of each evaluation. In both cases, the guard expression will have
been evaluated first, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, v′1〉
By the induction hypothesis:
v1≈lo v′1 : 〈bool, l〉
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
By two applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw v1 : 〈bool, l〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
and
`lw v′1 : 〈bool, l〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
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By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):
v1 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
v′1 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
We now split on the relative ordering of lo and l:
• Subcase lo < l:
Here, each evaluation may have E-IF1 or E-IF2 at its root, thus:
v ∈ {v2, v3}
v′ ∈ {v′2, v′3}
where
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v2〉
Π ` 〈∆1, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v3〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′2〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′3〉
In all outcomes, Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety) gives us:
`l v : S
`l v′ : S
By Lemma 4.24 (Typed Indistinguishability of Arbitrary Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
By the properties of g:
l ≤ (lglw) ⇒ lo < (lglw)
By two separate applications of Lemma A.12 (Preservation Under Evalua-
tion of Typed Indistinguishability for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆r
Σ `∆′1≈lo ∆′r
By two applications of Lemma A.11 (Transitivity of Typed Indistinguisha-
bility for Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
• Subcase lo 6< l:
In this subcase, it follows from Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability
of Values) that:
v1 = v′1
As a result, both evaluations must have the same rule at their root, giving us:
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
or
Π ` 〈∆1, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′3, e3〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
Appendix A. Proofs 141
In each possibility, the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
• Case T-LET:
We have:
e = let x = e1 in e2
Γ `lw e1 : S′
x 6∈ dom(Σ)
(Γ, x : S′) `lw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-LET could have been used at the
root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
Π∪ (x 7→ v1) ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, v′1〉
Π′∪ (x 7→ v′1) ` 〈∆′1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
By the induction hypothesis:
v1≈lo v′1 : S′
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw v1 : S′
`lw v′1 : S′
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π∪ (x 7→ v1), ∆1)
((Γ, x : S′), Σ)' (Π′∪ (x 7→ v′1), ∆′1)
By Definition A.8 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts):
(Γ, x : S′) `Π ∪ (x 7→ v1)≈lo Π′∪ (x 7→ v′1)
Consequently, the result follows from the induction hypothesis.
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• T-EQ
We have:
e = e1 == e2
S = 〈bool, l〉
Γ `lw e1 : 〈E, l〉
Γ `lw e2 : 〈E, l〉
E 6≡ enc(S)
By inspection of the evaluation rules, either E-EQ1 or E-EQ2 could have been
used at the root of each evaluation. In both cases, the two sub-expressions will
have been evaluated in left-to-right order, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, v1〉
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v2〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, v′1〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′2〉
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆r)
and
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′r)
By two applications of the induction hypothesis:
v1≈lo v′1 : 〈E, l〉
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
then
v2≈lo v′2 : 〈E, l〉
Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
We now split on the relative ordering of lo and l:
• Subcase lo < l:
Here, each evaluation may have E-EQ1 or E-EQ2 at its root, giving us:
v ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
v′ ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
where
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
Thus, for all possible outcomes, the other part of the result follows from
Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values).
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• Subcase lo 6< l:
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw v1 : 〈E, l〉
`lw v2 : 〈E, l〉
`lw v′1 : 〈E, l〉
`lw v′2 : 〈E, l〉
By Lemma A.3 (Canonical Forms):





















v1 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
v2 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
v′1 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
v′2 ∈ {TRUE, FALSE}
If E = l′ lm key, by Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation) we get:
l′ ≤ l ⇒ lo 6< l′
Consequently, for all possible forms of E, it follows from Definition A.6 (Typed




⇒ v1 = v2 iff v′1 = v′2
As a result, both evaluations must have the same rule at their root, giving us:
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, TRUE〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, TRUE〉
or
Π ` 〈∆, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, FALSE〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, FALSE〉





S = 〈E, lglw〉
Γ = [x : 〈E, l〉]
lw ≤ b〈E, lglw〉c
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By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-VAR could have been used at the
root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
(x 7→ v) ∈ Π





⇒ Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
By Definition A.8 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Contexts):
v≈lo v′ : 〈E, l〉
By the properties of g:
l ≤ (lglw) ⇒ 〈E, l〉 <: S




e = e1 := e2
Γ `lw e1 : 〈S loc,>〉
Γ `lw e2 : S
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-ASGN could have been used at the
root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆1, a〉
Π ` 〈∆1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆2, v〉
and
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e1〉 ⇓ 〈∆′1, a′〉
Π′ ` 〈∆′1, e2〉 ⇓ 〈∆′2, v′〉
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆2)
and
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′1)
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′2)
By the induction hypothesis:
Σ `∆1≈lo ∆′1
a≈lo a′ : 〈S loc,>〉
By a second application of the induction hypothesis:
Σ `∆2≈lo ∆′2
v≈lo v′ : S
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We now split of the equality or otherwise of a and a′:
• Subcase a = a′:
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
Σ `∆2(a 7→ v)≈lo ∆′2(a′ 7→ v′) ≡ Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
• Subcase a 6= a′:
By inspection of Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values), we
must have:
∀v1,v2 s.t. `⊥ v1 : S and `⊥ v2 : S, v1≈lo v2 : S
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw a : 〈S loc,>〉
`lw a′ : 〈S loc,>〉
`lw v : S
`lw v′ : S
By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈S loc, l1〉 ∈ Σ
a′ : 〈S loc, l2〉 ∈ Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
`⊥ ∆2[a] : S
`⊥ ∆2[a′] : S
`⊥ ∆′2[a] : S
`⊥ ∆′2[a′] : S
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`⊥ v : S
`⊥ v′ : S
Consequently, from the preconditions of this subcase, we get:
v≈lo ∆′2[a] : S
∆2[a′]≈lo v′ : S
}
⇒ Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r




S = 〈E, lglw〉
Γ `lw e′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉
lw ≤ bSc
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-DREF could have been used at the
root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
Π ` 〈∆, e′〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, a〉
v = ∆r(a)
and
Π′ ` 〈∆′, e′〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, a′〉
v′ = ∆′r(a
′)
By the induction hypothesis:
a≈lo a′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉
Σ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
We now split of the equality or otherwise of a and a′:
• Subcase a = a′:
By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
∆r(a)≈lo ∆′r(a′) : 〈E, l〉 ≡ v≈lo v′ : 〈E, l〉
By the properties of g:
l ≤ (lglw) ⇒ 〈E, l〉 <: S
By Lemma A.9 (Widening of Typed Indistinguishability for Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
• Subcase a 6= a′:
By inspection of Definition A.6 (Typed Indistinguishability of Values), we
must have:
lo <>
∀v1,v2 s.t. `⊥ v1 : 〈E, l〉 and `⊥ v2 : 〈E, l〉, v1≈lo v2 : 〈E, l〉
By Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw a : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆r)
and
`lw a′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc,>〉
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′r)
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By Lemma A.2 (Inversion of the Typing Relation):
a : 〈〈E, l〉 loc, l1〉 ∈ Σ
a′ : 〈〈E, l〉 loc, l2〉 ∈ Σ
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
`⊥ ∆r(a) : 〈E, l〉
`⊥ ∆′r(a′) : 〈E, l〉
Taking v1 = ∆r(a) and v2 = ∆′r(a
′), we get:
∆r(a)≈lo ∆′r(a′) : 〈E, l〉 ≡ v≈lo v′ : 〈E, l〉
By the properties of g:
l ≤ (lglw) ⇒ 〈E, l〉 <: S
By Lemma A.9 (Widening of Typed Indistinguishability for Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
• T-FNAPP:
We have:
e = f (ei i∈1..n)
f : {i : Si i∈1..n} l
′
w→〈E, l〉 ∈ Σ
lw ≤ l′w
∀i∈1..n Γ `lw ei : Si
By inspection of the evaluation rules, only E-FNAPP could have been used at
the root of each evaluation, therefore we must have:
∀i∈1..n Π ` 〈∆i−1, ei〉 ⇓ 〈∆i, vi〉
f (xi i∈1..n) = ef ∈ ∆n
(Π∪ x′′i 7→ vi) ` 〈∆n, [x′′i /xi ]ef 〉 ⇓ 〈∆r, v〉
and
∀i∈1..n Π′ ` 〈∆′i−1, ei〉 ⇓ 〈∆′i, v′i〉
f (x′i
i∈1..n) = e′f ∈ ∆′n
(Π′∪ x′′i 7→ v′i) ` 〈∆′n, [x′′i /x′i ]e′f 〉 ⇓ 〈∆′r, v′〉
where
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x′′i 6∈ dom(Π)
x′′i 6∈ dom(Π′)
x′′i 6∈ FV(ef )
x′′i 6∈ FV(e′f )
By n applications of Theorem 4.18 (Type Safety):
`lw vi : Si
(Γ, Σ)' (Π, ∆i)
and
`lw v′i : Si
(Γ, Σ)' (Π′, ∆′i)
}
∀i∈1..n
By n applications of the induction hypothesis:




By Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Environments):
ef = e′f
∀i∈1..n xi = x′i
}
⇒ [x′′i /xi ]ef = [x′′i /x′i ]e′f
By T-SUB and S-REFL:
`⊥ vi : Si w.r.t. Σ
`⊥ v′i : Si w.r.t. Σ
}
∀i∈1..n
By Definition 4.15 (Domain Consistency):
x′′i 6∈ dom(Γ)
(Γ, xi : Si) `l′w ef : S ⇒ (Γ, x′′i : Si) `l′w [x′′i /xi ]ef : S
((Γ, x′′i : Si), Σ)' ((Π ∪ x′′i 7→ vi), ∆n)
((Γ, x′′i : Si), Σ)' ((Π′∪ x′′i 7→ v′i), ∆′n)
By the transitivity of ≤:
lo ≤ l′w
The result therefore follows from the induction hypothesis.
• T-SUB:
We have:
Γ′ `l′w e : S′
Γ′⊆ Γ
S′<: S
lw ≤ l′w ⇒ lo ≤ l′w
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By the induction hypothesis:
Γ′ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
v≈lo v′ : S′
By inspection of Definition A.7 (Typed Indistinguishability of Evaluation Envi-
ronments):
Γ `∆r≈lo ∆′r
By Lemma A.9 (Widening of Typed Indistinguishability for Values):
v≈lo v′ : S
